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  According to Kwame Appiah, “the great liberal struggle” since the Enlightenment has 
concerned whether the state should treat citizens as self-directed individuals or 
acknowledge them in terms of social identities—ethnicity, culture, religion, or gender. 
Some thinkers, Appiah among them, have proposed solutions to this struggle and 
advocate for amending liberalism to include space for the recognition of difference. 
These “solutions” share at least one thing in common: critiques of John Rawls. However, 
Rawls seems to have a palatable answer to “the great liberal struggle,” though it seems he 
would frame it differently. Indeed, he acknowledges “the fact of pluralism,” as a 
permanent condition of our experience. In Part One I respond to three criticisms of 
Rawls’ ability to help with struggles over identity. I first explore Rawls’ understanding of 
a person in reference to Appiah’s discussion of the role of the state in “soul making,” 
inspired by J.S. Mill. Second, I consider Rawls’ understanding of “human nature” by 
responding to Will Kymlicka in considering among other things what Rawls’ “primary 
goods” might involve for cultural life. Finally, I will examine Rawls’ distinction between 
public political culture and the background culture in terms of the idea of public reason in 
response to Seyla Benhabib’s criticism that the distinction fails to elucidate guidelines in 
the face of many modern gender and familial issues. In Part Two, I offer two ways in 
which Rawls’ theory could be amended or extended in order to more adequately account 
for identity. First, Rawls’ theory could be amended to consider the role of comprehensive 
doctrines in the overlapping consensus. Second, Rawls’ theory could invite identity 
considerations into the political conception of primary goods. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
According to Kwame Appiah, “the great liberal struggle” since the Enlightenment 
has concerned whether the state should treat citizens as self-directed individuals or 
acknowledge them in terms of social identities—ethnicity, culture, religion, or gender.1 
Many liberals argue that state consideration of identity is patently illiberal: state 
acknowledgement of identity results in arbitrary advantages or disadvantages. 
Multiculturalists argue that the state must recognize social identity because the individual 
stripped of social context is prohibited from living a meaningful life.2 Several thinkers, 
Appiah among them, have proposed solutions to this struggle. Some have, for the most 
part, given up on liberalism.3 Others have given up on multiculturalism.4 And some have 
advocated amending liberalism to include space for the recognition of difference, albeit 
in vastly different ways.5 These “solutions” share at least one thing in common: critiques 
of John Rawls.* Rawls is faulted on his generally abstract theory and its inability to 
accommodate, acknowledge or recognize important social differences. However, Rawls 
seems to have a palatable answer to “the great liberal struggle,” though it seems he would 
frame it differently. Indeed, he acknowledges “the fact of pluralism,” as a permanent 
condition of our experience (PL). And he understands the fundamental problem of 
political liberalism in terms of that fact: “How is it possible that there exists over time a 
                                                
* All citations of Rawls will occur in text according to the following abbreviations. All other citations 
appear in endnotes following each chapter.  
TJ: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised ed. (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University, 1999). 
PL: John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded ed. (1993; New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). 
CP: John Rawls, Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1999). 
JF: John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2001). 
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stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable 
religious and moral doctrines?”  (PL xxv). My contention is that Rawls offers far-sighted 
guidelines for life and politics in a multicultural, diverse society.6 My aim will be to pick 
out Rawlsian guidelines that a reasonable pluralist society could not do without. While I 
argue that Rawlsian guidelines are indispensable, I also gesture towards places in which 
Rawls’ theory could be extended or amended for the purpose of considering the role of 
the state in fostering good lives for all citizens.   
This thesis will proceed by addressing the three major criticisms that Rawls takes 
seriously in order to discover and illustrate guidelines for dealing with some of the 
difficult social issues we face. Rawls’ liberalism is criticized “because it relies on an 
abstract conception of the person and uses an individualist, nonsocial, idea of human 
nature; or else that it employs an unworkable distinction between the public and the 
private that renders it unable to deal with the problems of gender and the family”  (PL 
xxix). I will first explore Rawls’ understanding of a person in reference to Appiah’s 
discussion of the role of the state in “soul making,” inspired by J.S. Mill. Second, I will 
consider Rawls’ understanding of “human nature” by responding to Will Kymlicka in 
considering what Rawls’ “primary goods” might involve for cultural life. Finally, I will 
examine Rawls’ distinction between public political culture and the background culture 
in terms of the idea of public reason  (PL 215). I do so in response to Seyla Benhabib’s 
criticism that the distinction fails to elucidate guidelines in the face of many modern 
gender and familial issues, especially when cultural practices conflict with constitutional 
essentials.7 
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After responding to these critiques, I will offer two ways in which Rawls’ theory 
could be amended or extended to more adequately account for identity. First, Rawls’ 
theory could be amended to consider the role of comprehensive doctrines in the 
overlapping consensus. Rawls introduces the idea of the overlapping consensus to 
provide a realistic vision of the well-ordered society in which citizens affirm the political 
conception of justice on its own terms of justification, even though they do so for very 
different reasons (JF §11). These reasons—religious belief, moral conviction, 
philosophical position, or cultural creed—are arguably excluded from some political 
considerations. While Rawls brackets the comprehensive doctrines to defend against the 
fact of oppression, such a move seems to have deleterious effects. There seems to be 
valid cause for concern if political engagement requires checking such important aspects 
of human life at the door. I would like to argue that citizens could bring their 
comprehensive reasons to the political table and at the same time affirm a political 
conception of justice, which is consistent with fact of pluralism. Second, I will consider 
the extent to which Rawls’ theory could invite cultural considerations into the political 
conception of primary goods. Theorists about identity are often too quick to give up on 
the abstract principles of justice on the grounds that they are too neutral. Similarly, 
liberals often quickly overlook cultural and social notions of the good on the grounds that 
they are not neutral enough. I will explore whether Rawls’ theory could be extended to 
consider different notions of the good held by various identities. I will make a case for 
the importance of abstract principles, but also invite theories of liberalism to 
acknowledge the way society, culture, and physical needs shape the lives of citizens. I 
would like to propose that even though Rawls understood primary goods within a 
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political conception of justice, considerations of identity may figure prominently in 
certain primary goods. Some primary goods, rights and liberties, are abstract and neutral. 
Other primary goods, opportunities, powers, and self-respect, seem to be shaped by 
context.8 
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Notes
                                                
 
1 Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) 70. 
2 Appiah 70 
3 See Tariq Modood, Multiculturalism, (Cambridge: Polity, 2007) 7 and Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking 
Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Basingstoke: MacMillian, 2000) 12 
4 Brain Barry, Culture and Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002) 317. 
5 See Appiah; Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); and 
Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002). 
6 I include “life” along with politics taking a cue from Martha Nussbaum that the state also includes some 
“very important prerequisites of general well-being. Politics is not just about politics, it is about and for 
life.” Martha Nussbaum, “Political Soul-Making and the Imminent Demise of Liberal Education,” Journal 
of Social Philosophy 37-2 (2006): 303. Also, Rawls suggests that he provides, at the very least, guidelines 
in response to critics in the preface of Political Liberalism: “…a conception of justice worked up by 
focusing on a few long-standing classical problems should be correct, or at least provide guidelines for 
addressing further questions” (PL xxix). 
7 See Benhabib 112. Constitutional essentials include both the general structure of government and the 
specification of equal basic rights and liberties. See PL Lecture IV, §5 “The Idea of Constitutional 
Essentials.” 
8 See JF §17.2 
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PART ONE: THE LIMITS AND POWERS OF RAWLS’ POLITICAL CONCEPTION 
 
 Rawls’ conception of justice has often been criticized on the grounds that it is 
incapable of acknowledging the social and cultural settings in which people live.1 Many 
critics offer alternative political theories, which prioritize the community and particular 
conceptions of the good life over the individual and justice.2 However many of these 
critiques and alternatives are of a piece with a tendency to interpret the moral and 
political world through an insufficiently narrow model, which assumes that political 
thought can be either individually or socially oriented, but not both. For example, Amy 
Gutmann describes communitarian critics of Rawls in terms of “the tyranny of dualisms,” 
which argues that “either our identities are independent of our ends, leaving us totally 
free to choose our life plans, or they are constituted by community, leaving us totally 
encumbered by socially given ends; either justice takes absolute priority over the good or 
the good takes the place of justice.”3 Gutmann notices that the both poles of this dualism 
are tremendously limited, and that pitting them against each other prevents discovering 
improved conceptions of justice and identity.4  
Indeed, guided by the tyranny of dualisms it is tempting to simply deny that 
Rawls could have anything meaningful to contribute to the question of identity at all. But 
this would be too fast. My goal in the first part of this thesis is to acknowledge the need 
to think through how to best balance individuals’ identity with the social world they live 
in. This is a crucial task because it opens a space for considering how to best improve life 
in pluralist democracies and for refining our conceptions of justice and identity. Yet this 
task is also challenging because of the entrenched assumption that individuality and 
social embeddedness are mutually exclusive. This assumption is evident in the extensive 
literature on Rawls that finds his work to be individualistic and therefore antithetical to 
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explorations of identity. In spite of this assumption, I seek a more balanced interpretation 
of Rawls and shall illustrate that he has a lot to offer to contemporary struggles over 
identity. Of course, this contribution is not without its shortcomings. But as I shall show 
these criticisms are constructive and do no challenge Rawls’ entire project. They help 
point the way toward improvements in his political conception and in our understanding 
of what is needed to simultaneously account for people’s identities and their life in the 
social world.  
Each of the three chapters of Part One respond to criticisms of Rawls by way of 
offering a more charitable and balanced interpretation aimed at discovering his 
contributions and shortcomings when it comes to helping with struggles over identity. 
Chapter one involves the question of whether Rawls’ conception of the person is too 
abstract to account for social identity and of whether the Rawlsian state could foster 
ethically successful citizens. The second chapter asks whether Rawls’ view of human 
nature is too individualistic to account for cultural identity. Finally, chapter three explores 
Rawls’ distinction between public and private in light of critics who claim that it is too 
restricted to account for gender and the family. In the end, I hope to expose the 
limitations of Rawls’ theory as well as disclose its guidelines for life in pluralist society. 
 
                                                                                                   
 
8
 
Notes
                                                
1 See Charles Taylor, “Atomism,” Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) and Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? (London: Duckworth,1988). Additionally, Alan Haworth provides a summary of critiques and 
a defense of Rawls in “Liberalism, Abstract Individualism, and the Problem of Particular Obligations,” Res 
Publica 11 (2005): 371-401. 
2 See Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 2nd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue 2nd Ed (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1984); 
and MacIntyre Whose Justice; and Marilyn Friedman, “Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating 
Community,” Ethics 99.2 (1989): 275-290. 
3 Amy Gutmann, “Communitarian Critiques of Liberalism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs. 14.3 (1985): 
308-322, 317. 
4 Gutmann 318 
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CHAPTER 1: IDENTITY AND THE POLITICAL CONCEPTION OF THE PERSON 
 
 This chapter explores the question of whether John Rawls’ political conception of 
the person is compatible with a robust sense of social identity. In the usual sense of the 
term, social identity refers to self-conception, describes social or cultural group 
membership, or invokes a political project aimed at achieving equal rights or other social 
needs. However, there is yet another way to think of identity, which places it firmly at the 
center of our lives. Several concepts have been offered to grasp at the contours and 
complexities that characterize human life. Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus and Charles Taylor’s 
social imaginaries attempt to capture the richness of identity in interpersonal, social, and 
cultural contexts. Kwame Anthony Appiah shares this inclination and he offers yet 
another concept, “ethical identity.” He holds that social identities—genders, sexual 
orientations, religions, ethnicities, nationalities, professions, and vocations—are 
“ethically central” and play a pivotal role in people’s lives. “Your identity,” Appiah 
explains, “your individuality, defines your ambitions, determines what achievements 
have significance in your own particular life.”1 In this sense, identity refers to who and 
what you are, who you want to be, and how you have come to understand your life and 
envision your future. Ethical identities have political significance too.2 Recognizing that 
all lives are made in a social context, Appiah argues that the government has important 
duties to help citizens shape their ethical identities, improving their chances at an 
ethically successful life.  
 The prospect of Rawls’ infamously abstract conception of the person 
acknowledging let alone fostering social identity in this sense may seem troubling. Rawls 
has contributed profoundly to the question of how to conceive of a just society, a question 
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important to everyone no matter his or her identity. But his admittedly abstract 
conception of the person is criticized for being too lofty and too sparse to account for the 
intricacies of identity. Further, Rawls is notorious for demanding that the state remain 
neutral with respect to comprehensive philosophical, moral and religious doctrines; we 
may be warranted in suspecting that the Rawlsian state could not do its duty to citizens, 
as Appiah believes ethical identity demands.  
 My contention is that many criticisms of Rawls’ conception of the person are based 
on the misunderstanding that abstraction and neutrality rule out the possibility that it 
could be amenable to identity. Neutrality and abstraction may indeed be problematic 
traits in Rawls’ political conception, but they may not warrant ruling out Rawls’ potential 
contribution to our understanding of social identity. I argue that while the political 
conception has its limits, it is compatible with a sense of social identity richly conceived, 
and also requires that the state dutifully foster certain values, ambitions and 
characteristics in its citizenry. In the first section, I illustrate how Rawls’ political 
conception of the person is complementary to his notion of moral identity, a candidate 
social identity concept. The second section explores whether the political conception of 
the person is too neutral to foster ethical success, as Appiah understands it. In conclusion, 
I disclose the strength of Rawls’ political conception of the person as I interpret it, and I 
address two difficulties regarding abstraction and neutrality in hopes of offering a critique 
that more fully considers Rawls’ position. 
I. The Political Conception of the Person 
 The first step in my argument that Rawls’ conception of the person and social 
identity are complementary requires tending to a popular misunderstanding. Many 
                                                                                                   
 
11
thinkers have worried deeply over Rawls’ notion of personhood as it relates to the 
original position. Michael Sandel offers perhaps its most famous expression. His main 
concern is that the Rawlsian person is an abstract Kantian metaphysical entity that is 
detached from any aims and commitments and, thus fails to capture meaningful human 
experience and value.3 In his eyes, Rawls paints human beings in a lonesome and 
disenchanted hue. This is especially true of the original position in which persons are 
placed behind the veil of ignorance where their knowledge of who and what they are, 
their identity, is abstracted from them for the purpose of making important political 
decisions.4 Stripped “of all possible constitutive attachments,” Rawls’ person is an 
ethically frail, thin image of a human being. 5 If such a conception of the person is 
“wholly without character” as Sandel argues, it cannot be a friend to identity.6 Further, he 
states “The identity of the agent is barren of constituent traits so that no aims…can be 
essential to it.”7 Indeed, if social identity pertains to a person’s traits and defines her 
aims, then Rawls fails to capture it. 
My argument must be able to meet the criticism that Rawls’ understanding of the 
person is barren, thin, and incomplete insofar as it is abstract and metaphysical. Rawls is 
unwilling to give up on abstraction. However, his conception of the person need not be 
understood metaphysically. I shall show that when Rawls political conception of the 
person represents democratic citizens it also captures an important aspect of social 
identity. In route to this goal, I describe how Rawls sets up the original position to 
illustrate how persons go about deciding on principles of justice. And I argue that this 
does not require dependence upon metaphysical assumptions about the person.8  
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Rawls’ justification of abstract points of view is helpful in making this case. He 
asserts that moving to greater levels of generality is useful for finding solutions to the 
most intractable social and political problems. As he states, “The work of abstraction… is 
not gratuitous” (PL 45) Instead, he considers the retreat to more abstract levels to be a 
solution to the breakdown of shared understandings at lower levels. This “retreat” in the 
face of conflict is simply an appeal to general principles and fundamental ideas. Rawls 
finds these ideas in the democratic tradition: in the conflict over toleration, for instance, 
which found its “footing in equality” (PL 45). He advocates looking to these general 
principles in the interest of conceiving of society “as a fair system of cooperation over 
time” (PL 46). Further, he asks that we do so democratically by seeking broad agreement 
about principles of justice. This ascendance to greater levels of generality is modeled in 
the original position in which representatives of citizens “agree to the fair terms of social 
cooperation (as expressed by the principles of justice).”9  
Sandel’s worry that Rawls’ original position represents an abstract, barren self is 
based on a misunderstanding of the way in which citizens are represented there. 
Specifically, the original position is mistakenly understood to offer a metaphysical 
definition of the person. But it is clear especially given Rawls’ clarification of the idea 
throughout his career that he never meant the original position to refer to persons in a 
metaphysical way.10 The original position is merely a device of representation. It is laid 
out for the purpose of simulating an agreement made by persons considered free and 
equal under fair terms and conditions. Thus Rawls insists that the original position is a 
point of view of political justice “removed from and not distorted by the particular 
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features and circumstances” of everyday life and thus free of prejudice and favoritism 
(PL 23).  
 The original position models impartiality with the veil of ignorance. Behind the 
veil, parties in the original position are restricted from knowing many aspects of 
themselves or each other; they are ignorant of the race, class, gender, talents, and 
endowments of the citizens they represent. Rawls is clear that the veil of ignorance is 
only meant to model the “acceptable restrictions” placed on the reasons that could be 
used to justify choosing particular principles of justice and rejecting others (JF 80). Any 
appeal to one’s own social position is unacceptable, on Rawls’ view. “The fact that we 
occupy a particular social position, say, is not a good reason for us to accept, or to expect 
others to accept, a conception of justice that favors a particular position” (JF 18). Instead, 
Rawls asks that the parties and the citizens they represent “take into account the good of 
all” (PL 106). The veil of ignorance ensures that parties in the original position could not 
promote their own interests without promoting all the other parties’ interests as well.11 
Bernard Williams describes this as “an elaborate and simple idea.”12 Rawls specifies that 
a “fair system of arrangements is one that the parties can agree to without knowing how it 
will benefit them personally.”13 The original position simply models fair circumstances 
by imposing restrictions that require impartiality and thus eliminates prejudice and 
favoritism.  
 There may be several reasons to question whether the original position is the most 
sensible way to accomplish fair agreement about the principles of justice. However, an 
argument against it could not be built upon the premise that the original position distorts 
real persons’ in egregious ways. The original position is no place for real persons. It is 
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merely a point of view for considering what fairness requires. However, the original 
position certainly warrants the suspicion that Rawls could not account for social identity. 
He does, after all, ask us to imagine ourselves without one. To address this concern, I 
discuss Rawls’ political conception of the person as free and equal.  
 Rawls’ political conception of the person emerges in Political Liberalism where he 
further distances himself from metaphysical notions of personhood and responds to a 
mistake he made in A Theory of Justice where he offered a notoriously normative or 
comprehensive conception of the person (PL xvi).14 In Political Liberalism Rawls offers 
an understanding of the citizenship that assumes that persons are voluntarily engaged in 
social cooperation. That is, a person is someone who is engaged in social life with others. 
According to Samuel Freeman, he provides an “empirical basis for accepting an ideal of 
citizens as free and equal persons with the two moral powers.”15 Thus he corrects his 
previously normative view of persons and further disabuses us of the erroneous 
metaphysical suspicions.  
 The political conception of the person as free and equal is simply based on the fact 
of social cooperation and the capacities we must develop to engage in such social 
behavior.16 The two moral powers describe these capacities in the most basic sense: 
1) The capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from (and not merely in 
accordance with) the principles of political justice that specify the fair terms of 
social cooperation. 
 2) The capacity to have, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the 
good. Such a conception is an ordered family of final ends and aims which 
specifies a person’s conception of what is of value in human life, or...what is 
regarded as a fully worthwhile life. (JF 19) 
 
Ideally, persons are equal because they possess an equal requisite amount of the moral 
powers. This guards against prejudice and favoritism in political considerations and 
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protects all identities from unequal treatment. No society that conceives of political 
persons as equal could justify slavery, castes, or other institutionalizations of inequality. 
Thus the political conception of the person as free and equal belongs to a society 
governed according to the political conception of justice, which guarantees basic rights 
and liberties (PL 33). Persons are free because they see each other and themselves as 
“having the moral power to have a conception of the good” (PL 30). As the second moral 
power states, people are not required to have the same conception of the good throughout 
their lives. One may convert religions, change her devotions, or join new affiliations. 
Regardless of such changes, citizens’ “political identity as free persons is not affected” 
(PL 30). Thus the political conception of the person as free and equal means that people 
of all identities must be treated equally regardless of their identity, and that political 
citizenship does not depend on a person’s conception of the good.  
 Rawls seems to have moved a step closer to offering a notion of personhood that 
could be compatible with a robust sense of social identity. However, there is still a sense 
in which large tracts of social identity are left out or even abstracted from in the political 
conception. There may be plenty of reasons for concern about this exclusion from the 
political point of view. I discuss two of these concerns in the third section of this chapter. 
For now, I would like to turn to how the political conception of the person is centrally 
important to the lives of citizens and relates to their self-conception. Thus, I offer the 
interpretation that the political conception of the person and social identity are 
complementary ideas. I also expose Rawls’ contribution to the notion of social identity 
itself.   
 Rawls offers three interpretations of the political conception of the person as free.17 
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In exploring the first, Rawls coins the term “moral identity,” which I interpret as an 
attempt to capture a robust sense of social identity.18 Rawls holds that moral identity is so 
centrally important to our lives that if it were suddenly lost, “we would be disoriented and 
unable to carry on” (PL 31). Indeed, not unlike Appiah’s ethical identity, Rawls 
understands moral identity to mean “our conception of ourselves” or “the kind of persons 
we want to be” (PL 31 n.34). However, a distinguishing feature of moral identity is that 
Rawls analyses the concept into “two kinds of moral commitments, which give shape to a 
persons’ life, what one sees oneself as doing and trying to accomplish in the social 
world” (PL 31). One set of commitments refers to a person’s political aims, the desire to 
see the values of justice embodied by the political institutions of their society (PL 30). 
The second type involves a person’s nonpolitical aims, her conception of the good, deep 
commitments, personal affairs, loyalties, devotions, and beliefs. It is important to note 
that moral identity is composed of both political and nonpolitical aims and commitments.  
 While the political and nonpolitical aims and values intermingle in moral identity, 
the political conception of the person only specifies citizens’ political aims and values. 
As free persons, citizens have the capacity and right to see themselves “as independent 
from and not identified with any particular conception [of the good] that they affirm at 
any given time” (PL 30). It is tempting to accuse Rawls of an untoward exclusion here. 
However, it is important to note that the conception of the person as free requires that 
one’s identity, as a matter of basic law remain unaffected by changes in nonpolitical 
identity. Hence, it refrains from invoking any nonpolitical aims. For example, the 
political conception of the person ensures each citizen’s freedom to change religions. 
When a person converts religions, her moral identity may change in profound ways. 
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Conversion certainly alters a person’s conception of the good, and will most definitely 
affect her aims and her commitments. However, Rawls stipulates that her public 
identity—her basic rights and duties—ought to remain unaffected by such changes. (PL 
31). That conversion implies no change in public identity requires that one’s citizenship 
not be based upon her comprehensive conceptions of the good. It is based instead on her 
possession of the two moral powers, her capacity to engage in social cooperation.   
 In effect, the political conception of the person as free provides citizens great 
leeway in how they come to understand their moral identity and what life is best for 
them. At the same time, the political conception of the person is an attempt to “represent, 
theoretically, how we actually conceive of ourselves in our capacity as democratic 
citizens.” 19 This political self-conception is nontrivially related to how Rawls 
understands social identity. This is because moral identity captures both the dynamic 
intricacies of our deeper nonpolitical aims and our political aims simultaneously. Thus an 
important aspect of our social identity is the sense we have of ourselves as “citizens.” 
Even while the political conception is detached from social identity, our understanding of 
ourselves as citizens exists along side our comprehensive understanding of ourselves. 
Within moral identity, political aims are understood to be as central to the lives of people 
as nonpolitical aims. The political conception of the person must be complementary with 
social identity, because it picks out and helps to represent our political aims, while 
safeguarding our freedom to pursue and revise our nonpolitical aims. 
 Rawls’ great contribution to understanding the meaning of social identity is his 
insistence that political values like equal respect, liberty of conscience and freedom of 
thought are matters of central importance in the lives and self-conceptions of people in 
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pluralist democracies. However, even while Rawls gives the political an important seat in 
moral identity, we may still worry that the nonpolitical aspect of moral identity remains 
outside of the political conception. This consideration points to a deeper criticism 
regarding whether social identity ought to have a bigger role in the political. I return to 
this question in Section III. More immediately, I consider the role of the state in fostering 
the political aims of its citizens.  
II. Appiah, Soul Making and Ethical Success 
I now turn to the question of whether the Rawlsian state could help foster ethical 
success in its citizens. Appiah charges that Rawls is too neutral to allow for state 
interventions intended to foster citizens’ ethical success. He states, Rawls “insisted that 
governments should be neutral among different reasonable conceptions of the good life, 
taking the fact of pluralism—the fact that there is a variety of such conceptions—to be an 
inevitable condition of modern democratic life.”20 According to Appiah, if Rawls is 
neutral with respect to conceptions of the good, then the state could have no interest in 
the quality of citizen’s lives. Rawls indeed argues that the state must remain neutral by 
not endorsing or favoring any comprehensive doctrine.21 However, given Rawls’ 
understanding of moral identity, it is not entirely clear whether Rawls’ neutrality entails 
that the state must remain aloof to its citizen’s success: the Rawlsian state could certainly 
foster and develop people’s political aims and commitments. The task of this section is to 
clarify whether Rawls’ neutrality prevents the state from acting in the interest of citizen’s 
ethical success. In order to accomplish this I first consider Appiah’s understanding of 
ethical success and what it would mean for a state to foster it through what he calls “soul 
making.”  Following Martha Nussbaum’s cue, I then argue that Rawls’ political 
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conception is a “partial ethical conception,” and therefore the state can help citizens 
succeed.22 While this does not entail directly impacting citizens’ comprehensive aims and 
commitments, I shall show that it certainly “improves their chances of an ethically 
successful life.”23   
The question of ethical success is intimately related to the role of others in 
shaping our notion of the good life. If a person constructed her notion of the good life all 
on her own, her success is measured according to whether her wants and desires are met. 
This is a popular tenet of modern morality, but it proves to be an inaccurate, if not dismal, 
view of life. Human lives are lived socially; we describe the good using a public language 
and make our way through life in a populated world. So Appiah articulates a notion of the 
good life in which others play a profound role. “A person’s shaping of her life flows from 
her beliefs and from a set of values, tastes, and dispositions of sensibility, all of these 
influenced by various forms of social identity.”24 For Appiah, life is always shaped from 
a combination of social circumstance, personality, and experience. So ethical success is 
by and large determined by looking at a how well a person shapes her life out of the 
social material given to her by society. A life goes well “if a person has mostly done for 
others what is owed them (and is thus morally successful) and has succeeded in creating 
things of significance and in fulfilling her ambitions (and thus is ethically successful)” 
(162). The role of the state in the former is largely uncontroversial. In the latter the role 
of the state is hotly contested.  
The state fosters ethical success in its citizens when it improves their chances of 
fulfilling their ambitions and creating things of significance. As a firm believer in 
individual autonomy, Appiah suggests “If we are the authors of ourselves, it is the state 
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and society that provide us with the tools and the contexts of our authorship; we may 
shape ourselves, but others shape our shaping.”25 Appiah imagines a society 
characterized by individual liberty but also governed by a caring and carefully anti-
paternalist perfectionist state. Perfectionists believe that what the state ought to do cannot 
be determined simply by referencing what citizens already desire.26 Sometimes, Appiah 
notes, “it may well be that your good requires that your desires be changed.”27 
Perfectionists have a more-than-want-regarding or an ideal-regarding conception of 
human happiness, which defines human flourishing.28 The ideal-regarding conception is 
usually discussed in terms of wants and desires. To support his position on individuality 
and ethical success, Appiah argues for an extension of this ideal-regarding view.29 Rather 
than discuss well-being only in terms of desires, he argues that we should consider ethical 
identity, and that we should focus on “a consideration not (just) of what we want but of 
who we are.”30 Such consideration moves the basic question of well-being from 
individual desires to include questions concerning “what sort of life one wants to 
make.”31 Thus, the state has a particular duty to influence “not merely the fulfillment of 
our ambitions, but the nature of our ambitions.”32 That is, the state has a role in helping to 
shape our identities such that we do what is best for ourselves and strive for success in 
whatever identity we decide to make.  
Emphasis on the nature of our ambitions is certainly more than a want regarding; 
it is soul making. “By soul making I mean the project of intervening in the process of 
interpretation through which each citizen develops an identity—and doing so with the 
aim of increasing her chances of living an ethically successful life.”33 Appiah is careful to 
distinguish soul making from the ways in which any state could affect a life, i.e. through 
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protection of person and property, the enforcement of contracts, the dissemination of 
information, providing resources and opportunities etc. Soul making requires intentional 
state action directed toward improving the ethical success of individuals. The project of 
soul making involves a particular set of interventions that seem for the most part 
agreeable to many liberals: the state should help citizens live more rational lives, the state 
should prohibit discrimination so that all citizens can enjoy a life of dignity free of 
prejudice, and the state should educate the young to become self-determined and 
ambitious citizens.  
Appiah’s suspicion that the Rawlsian state does not condone soul making seems 
well founded given Rawls’ frequent rejection of perfectionism, and his preference for 
political autonomy over moral autonomy. To be sure, Rawls would reject soul making 
insofar as it based on a comprehensive liberalism. Similarly, Appiah would reject Rawls’ 
ubiquitous comprehensive/political distinction, which finds its way into his notion of 
social identity itself when Rawls distinguishes between political and nonpolitical aims 
(PL 31). How these differences get settled will depend on whether we should prefer 
comprehensive or a political liberalism. Instead, of making an argument for one at the 
expense of the other, I would like to focus on how Appiah’s contribution to our thinking 
on social identity could help us understand the reach of Rawls’ moral identity. Indeed, 
Appiah’s argument for soul making is an invitation to consider (1) whether Rawls’ 
political conception of the person is also an ethical conception, (2) to what extent a state 
that understands citizens as such is capable of fostering ethical success, and (3) what the 
Rawlsian state’s ethical project would entail. I consider each in turn.  
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Consideration (1) regards whether Rawls’ political conception of the person is too 
neutral to be considered an ethical conception. Of course, it is easier to consider moral 
identity as an ethical concept. Insofar as ethics refers to wider considerations of what 
kinds of lives are good or bad, moral identity’s concern with “what kind of person one 
wants to be” seems to invoke a wide and ethical sense.34 Thus it can be inferred that the 
political conception of the person is a partial ethical conception, because it represents the 
political aspect of moral identity. Additionally, Nussbaum argues that regardless of its 
neutrality among comprehensive doctrines, “The Rawlsian state…is not ethically neutral. 
The political sphere is what Rawls repeatedly calls a ‘partial moral conception; he also 
characterizes it as a ‘module’ that can be attached to the rest of one’s comprehensive 
doctrine.”35 Nussbaum suggests that the political sphere is a partial ethical conception. 36 
It is partial because it does not use ethical ideas like the “soul” or “moral autonomy” in 
political deliberation; these terms are controversial for many comprehensive doctrines 
(Nussbaum, 303). However, according to Nussbaum the political uses shared ethical 
concepts like equal respect, the priority of liberty, and the difference principle. She 
argues that regardless of its neutrality the Rawlsian state is quite capable of fostering 
political values in its citizens. Thus, the political conception of the person is a partial 
ethical conception and the values and aims that make up one’s self-conception as a 
citizen are partially ethical ones.    
Of course, Appiah’s ethical identity is a fully ethical concept. Insofar as the state 
has a duty to foster it, there is no restriction on how and where the state can interfere, so 
long as it respects autonomy and individuality. That is, Appiah does not parse what aims 
and ambitions the state could perfect, and the Appiahan state would certainly look to 
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foster citizen’s deeper aims. On the other hand, the Rawlsian state is restricted to the 
political conception of the person, and so it could only foster citizens’ political aims and 
commitments. The nonpolitical aims and commitments are out of the bounds of state 
action. Thus, the line that restricts the Rawlsian political conception to a partial ethical 
conception is drawn down the middle of Rawls’ notion of moral identity.  
I now turn to consideration (2), regarding whether the Rawlsian state could foster 
ethical success. The answer turns on the question of whether or not focusing only on 
political aims is sufficient for helping people achieve ethical success. Recall that for 
Appiah people are ethically successful if they fulfill their ambitions and create things of 
significance. However, some of these ambitions and things of significance may be 
entirely related to a comprehensive doctrine. A person may desire to become a minister 
or write scholarly articles on Kant. While the Rawlsian state would certainly not inhibit 
these nonpolitical ambitions, it is hard to see how it could have a direct and intentional 
hand in cultivating these specific kinds of success. So it is not the case that focus on 
political identity is enough to foster full ethical success. It could however, foster partial 
ethical success. While not direct and intentional, partial ethical success entails fostering 
citizens’ political identities and ensuring adequate material well-being. Fostering citizens’ 
partial success will proceed along terms much narrower than Appiah’s view. It will entail 
“ensuring continued support for the values that form part of the political conception 
itself,” and thus cultivating citizens’ political aims and commitments.37 This would 
involve, among other things, educating citizens to understand and think critically about 
their own citizenship. Additionally, Rawls helps improve the chances of citizen’s ethical 
success by focusing on material and economic conditions. According to Nussbaum, the 
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Rawlsian state has a duty to ensure that “general prerequisites of well-being” are met. 
The prerequisites are intended for the purpose of improving people’s lives in general by 
providing a just distributive scheme that ensures all persons receive basic needs.38  
In light of consideration (3) I would like to describe Rawlsian state projects that 
could promote  (partial) ethical success. The Rawlsian state could participate in any 
project that concerns the module of political values that all citizens share as part of their 
moral or social identity. As Nussbaum says: “The state does not have to pussyfoot around 
with these things: it can teach them flat out, as the best ideas to live with together.”39 She 
uses the example of teaching young students about anti-discrimination. Because our 
constitution forbids discrimination based on race, the state is justified in educating 
students about anti-discrimination laws themselves, but it also “should actively bring up 
small children as nonracist citizens.”40 For that matter, steps toward political inclusion 
through anti-discrimination legislation is itself a powerful ethical project. 
Antidiscrimination legislation could improve your chances at ethical success by ensuring 
that you have fair opportunities to gain employment and receive education. However, it 
could also improve your chance at ethical success by improving your self-conception and 
social identity. When the state extends its ideal of citizenship to those previously and 
unduly excluded, it invites them to change, develop, and actualize political aims that were 
once unavailable to them. Thus they are able to reshape their conception of themselves as 
citizens for the better (PL 84). As Rawls states “The ideal of citizenship can be learned, 
and may elicit an effective desire to be [a free and equal] person” (PL 71). Thus a state’s 
commitment to anti-discrimination and inclusivity partially fosters people’s social 
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identities when it inspires them to see themselves in terms of the political conception of 
the person: as a free and equal citizens.  
III. Guidelines and Shortcomings 
 Throughout this chpater I have emphasized several strengths in Rawls’ political 
conception of the person. There are at least two features of this conception that offer 
indispensable and helpful guidelines for struggles over social identity. First, the 
conception of the person as free and equal ensures that the basic institutions of society are 
set up in such a way as to benefit all citizens, regardless of identity. A person’s 
nonpolitical identity does not affect her identity as a matter of basic law. Thus the 
political conception of the person takes into account the fact that people live in rich 
contexts and have deep ambitions that change and develop throughout making a life. 
Second, Rawls’ moral identity understands political values to be at the center of human 
life, along with deeper aims and ambitions. This insight exposes a profound connection 
between the way in which people make their lives and their understanding of the terms of 
their citizenship. Thus the state can help citizens foster their political aims and 
commitments, which have a resoundingly positive effect on their self-conception.  
My strategy in this chapter has been to respond to critiques of Rawls by offering 
clarification about the role of abstraction and neutrality in his political conception of the 
person. I now offer two shortcomings with respect to Rawls’ ability to help with struggles 
over identity that emerge regardless of the compatibility of the political conception and 
moral identity. The first involves the original position and its veil of ignorance; the 
second addresses the possibility and appropriateness of neutrality. In light of these 
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shortcomings, I gesture toward reconsidering the sharp distinction between public and 
nonpolitical aims within political considerations.  
In contrast to the critique of the original position I discussed in Section I, I now 
turn to an epistemological critique to reveal a severe shortcoming in the implementation 
of the veil of ignorance. Seyla Benhabib questions the extent to which Rawls succeeds in 
his goal of modeling impartiality when he invokes the veil of ignorance.41 Benhabib 
grants that being deprived of self-knowledge may cause individuals to be more 
considerate of other social positions, as Rawls hopes the veil of ignorance does. However 
she argues that restricting knowledge of others is detrimental when it comes to directly 
confronting and remedying social prejudices. Consider the two possible ways we could 
get to know one another in the original position.42 First, parties could know each other 
behind the veil of ignorance because they all are “similarly situated.” What you could 
know of others behind the veil is equivalent to what you know of yourself: you are a free 
and equal person who possesses the two moral powers (JF 80). That is, you could know 
each other in terms of the political conception of the person. Second, behind the veil we 
know of others because we bring information with us from our social life, including 
assumptions and prejudices we may have about them. But this information is a mere list 
of nonpolitical identities that are disassociated from persons once parties are behind the 
veil of ignorance. The heart of the problem, for Benhabib, is that this information is 
restricted, but it is not ever confronted or disposed of.  
On the one hand selves in the ‘original position’ bring with them into the process 
of imaginary deliberation all the assumptions and prejudices which guide them in 
everyday life; on the other hand, these assumptions and prejudices are not really 
‘defused,” that is confronted, discussed, worked out and worked through in an 
open dialogue.43  
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Under the epistemic restrictions of the original position, persons are simply unable to deal 
directly with prejudice. Without direct knowledge of the experiences of people of 
different nonpolitical identities, citizens could not confront their own prejudices. Doing 
so requires learning about the lives of other people.44  
In terms of the previous discussion of moral identity, the heart of this shortcoming 
lies in the fact that the content of nonpolitical identity is abstracted from in the political 
conception of the person. As I have shown, its absence is directly connected to the 
guideline that citizenship is not based on nonpolitical identity. An adequate Rawlsian 
response to Benhabib’s critique requires working out how to include nonpolitical content 
in the political on one hand, while maintaining the guideline on the other. This may be 
possible because Rawls’ own political conception of the person as free and equal requires 
first and foremost setting up fair terms and conditions. If Benhabib’s epistemological 
critique holds and free exchange of information is required for confronting prejudice, 
then it seems that Rawls’ political conception of the person may require rethinking the 
original position for deciding on the principles of justice. Indeed, Rawls’ own political 
conception of the person may require the revision of the original position.45 Nussbaum 
argues that the contract doctrine simply does not do justice to the inviolability of each 
person as a matter of justice. 46 Rather than seeing each other as rough equals behind the 
veil of ignorance with only political identity, Nussbaum suggests thinking of each other 
“as people with varying degrees of capacity and disability.”47 Doing so, of course, would 
require having information about one another, including our varying conceptions of the 
good life and deeper aims and ambitions. This critique suggests inviting the nonpolitical 
details of individual’s lives into the political conception of citizenship. Indeed, it may 
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require understanding political and nonpolitical aims to be as entwined in political life as 
they are in nonpolitical life.48  
The second shortcoming concerns Rawls’ appeal to the “unfortunate” term: 
neutrality (PL 191). Even though on Nussbaum’s reading Rawls is not “ethically neutral,” 
he still proffers a notion of neutrality, which he calls neutrality of aim. “Neutrality of aim 
means that those institutions and policies are neutral in the sense that they can be 
endorsed by citizens generally as within the scope of a public political conception” (JF 
153 n.27). To garner this wide endorsement, the state must remain “neutral” with respect 
to different conceptions of the good; it must avoid controversial comprehensive issues.49 
Furthermore, the political conception of the person as free and equal requires that the 
political sphere remain “neutral” with respect to the intricacies of nonpolitical identity. 
As one of Rawls’ guidelines suggests, the state would violate a person’s equality if it 
based citizenship on identity, and it would violate a person’s freedom to pursue their own 
conception of the good if it governed according to one such conception.  
However, neutrality is notoriously called into question. Appiah explains that it is 
simply impossible for states to act neutrally: “necessarily, many state acts will have 
differential impacts on people of different identities, including religious identities.”50 At 
the same time, Appiah offers “neutrality as equal respect” as a neutrality concept that I 
argue is similar to neutrality of aim and is salvageable from criticisms of other neutrality 
concepts.51  Neutrality as equal respect, “insists that state acts should treat people of 
diverse social identities with equal respect.”52 This is the idea that the state should be 
neutral among identities such that the state does not disadvantage anyone on the basis of 
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his or her identity. Appiah’s analysis of this neutrality concept helps us to see the 
difficulty in Rawls more clearly.  
Neutrality as equal respect problematically relies upon a tremendously general 
consideration of identity. Appiah attaches neutrality as equal respect to a particular test: 
“where an act disadvantages people of identity L, they can reasonably ask whether they 
could have been treated better, had they not been regarded as L’s.”53 The test is useful in 
discerning when a state inadvertently advantages certain identities and thus fails to act in 
accordance with neutrality as equal respect.54 The state does so when it overtly or 
inadvertently treats different identities unequally. So the test is useful in cases of blatant 
discrimination against social groups. For example, if voting rights within a state are 
differentially based on identity, then the state fails to satisfy neutrality as equal respect. 
Before suffrage, the state’s treatment of women in the US did not pass the test. Women 
would have been treated better had they not been regarded as women—they would have 
been treated better had they been regarded as men. Neutrality as equal respect’s important 
strength is that it demands: “The government should not aim…to constrain…identity as 
such.”55  
However, Appiah notes that the test is unhelpful under circumstances in which the 
specificity of an individual’s identity is at issue. Consider Mr. Thomas, a Jehovah’s 
Witness who quit his job for religious reasons after being transferred by his company to a 
position that manufactured military weapons.56 He was refused unemployment payments, 
because an Indiana court held that his pacifism did not warrant an exemption from 
unemployment law. In applying the neutrality of equal respect test, Appiah points out that 
the relevant question is “whether he would have been granted unemployment pay if he 
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had quit his job for a reason of conscience other than a Jehovah’s Witness’s.”57 But what 
corollary identity should we consider? We could consider how he would have been 
treated had he been a secular pacifist or a person who quit his job because of a more 
mainstream religious conviction, such as the Sabbath.58 But depending on which we 
choose, the test provides us with no clear answer: he would have faired better had he 
been a member or a mainstream religion and worse had he been considered a secular 
pacifist.59 Indeed on closer inspection, Appiah notes that both of the tribunals that 
rejected Mr. Thomas’ claim were acting consistently with neutrality as equal respect: his 
faith as a Jehovah’s witness played less of a role in the decision than the fact that other 
Jehovah’s Witnesses permitted work on armaments. That is, they interpreted his 
particular act of pacifism as it were a result of “personal” believes rather than religious 
ones.60 Appiah concludes that we should not defend this outcome just because it is 
consistent with neutrality as equal respect. But we can also conclude that neutrality as 
equal respect is helpful only when applied to identities generally. The shortcoming, for 
Appiah, amounts to the inability of neutrality as equal respect to consider the particularity 
of individual identities in subtle and nuanced, but important contexts. Neutrality as equal 
respect fails to acknowledge that Mr. Thomas faces a serious and ethically undeserved 
dilemma: He can either live according to his religious convictions or feed his family. A 
state that respects Mr. Thomas has a duty to prevent this bleak choice. Neutrality as equal 
respect is insufficient. 
While it may not be a perfect analogy for Rawls’ neutrality of aim, Appiah’s 
consideration of the shortcoming of neutrality as equal respect is quite similar to a one we 
find in Rawls. From within the political conception, Rawls would consider any citizen 
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according to her political identity as if she was any other citizen, and, thankfully her 
identity would not dictate the terms of her citizenship. This is a quite necessary 
protection, and it is indispensable for life in a pluralist society. But is it enough? The 
political conception of the person is only capable of accounting for moral identity 
generally. It acknowledges that you have one and that you ought to be free to define it or 
alter it as you see fit. But the nonpolitical aspect of your moral identity is kept out of 
view. Neutrality of aim and the political conception of the person are simply insufficient 
insofar as they fail to politically consider persons in their specificity, in terms of the 
deeper aims and commitments of moral identity.  
Appiah’s contention is that identity-derived interests deserve serious attention 
within the political sphere, and this includes conceptions of citizenship. Rawls seems to 
err on the side of caution with his neutrality of aim and his political conception of the 
person. He worries that invoking rich social identities in formulating a conception of 
citizenship will lead to state endorsement or favoritism and restrict the freedom and 
equality of persons in democratic society. However good his intentions, this stanches the 
flow of social learning and prevents the political consideration of individual’s self-
conception and social location. The question remains whether the attempt to include the 
complex contours of nonpolitical identity within political considerations could amount to 
endorsement, restriction, or exclusion. But so long as nonpolitical identity never fixes the 
terms of citizenship, it seems unlikely that the political consideration of the central 
matters of a person’s moral identity as a whole could be dangerous. Indeed, in many of 
the complex struggles over identity emerging in our growing pluralist society, justice 
seems to require inviting comprehensive identity issues to the political table.  
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possible to reach such a political understanding of what are to count as appropriate claims?” (PL 179). Thus 
Rawls must find a way to specify all citizens’ interests without reliance on any comprehensive doctrine. So 
he limits the primary goods to what people need as free and equal persons interested in socially advancing 
their view of the good. Questions abound regarding whether the list Rawls enumerates is complete and 
whether it could be applicable to every citizen. (See Chapter 5 below.) Indeed, Nussbaum notes that Rawls 
grappled with the enumeration of the primary goods throughout his life. It is enough for my purposes here 
to simply suggest, with Nussbaum, that the primary goods are evidence for the Rawlsian state’s partial 
ethical concern for citizens. The primary goods stem from ethical concern about the opportunities afforded 
to citizens and the ability of individuals to live ethically successful lives. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE SOCIAL NATURE OF HUMAN BEINGS 
 
 Political thinkers have offered several different accounts of human nature. Some 
emphasize the social and communal character of human life. Others take a more atomistic 
view, taking the individual alone as the political unit. Notoriously, the individualist warns 
that too much emphasis on social groups constrains individual liberty. Isaiah Berlin 
describes the desire “for a life of common dependence” within social groups as a 
fallacious attempt to achieve liberty, and he identifies collectivities with totalitarianism 
and dictatorships.1 Proponents of the communal view of human nature, however, fear that 
the latter is so individualistic that it strips human beings from the cultural and social 
context that constitute them.2 This causes people to become estranged from one another 
and creates divisions between the multiple facets that make up an individual life. Thus, 
individualist political theories are criticized for purporting a view of human nature that 
lends itself quite easily to undemocratic bureaucracies.3 While the individualist view is 
often associated with liberalism and the communally oriented view is often described as 
illiberal, it is not the case that liberalism necessitates one or the other. Indeed, this chapter 
concerns attempts on behalf of two liberals, John Rawls and Will Kymlicka, to reconcile 
these views within a liberal framework.  
 The question of how Rawls can help with cultural identity can be answered 
simply by determining the extent to which he acknowledges the importance of culture 
and community in human life. Kymlicka points out that Rawls fails to take the 
importance of culture seriously enough. So he seizes this opportunity to offer an 
extension of Rawls’ theory of justice that can accommodate the needs of minority 
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cultures and remedy the injustices committed against them by majority cultures.4 While I 
agree that there may be serious shortcomings in Rawls’ ability to accommodate cultural 
claims, I argue that Kymlicka’s appropriation of Rawls is contradictory and mistaken. My 
argument begins with a reading of Rawls’ understanding of human nature. Doing so sets 
the tone for a discussion of Kymlicka who argues on Rawlsian grounds that minority 
cultures ought to be granted group rights. Even while I argue that Kymlicka’s argument is 
suspicious, it reveals an important Rawlsian guideline for life in a pluralist society and 
exposes a potential shortcoming regarding the capacity of Rawls’ political liberalism to 
sufficiently accommodate individuals of various cultures. 
I. Human Nature and Society 
Rawls’ Political Liberalism “begins by taking the facts of social group 
membership seriously.”5 Rawls does so, as Iris Marion Young suggests, largely in 
response to the communitarian criticism that A Theory of Justice relies so heavily on the 
individual that it fails to make sense in reference to the gregarious nature of human life. It 
failed, that is, to recognize the fact that human beings have “responsibilities and 
allegiances—families, clans, nations, ethnic groups, religious communities, occupational 
groups, cultural communities defined by region or social class.”6 Young rightly notes that 
Rawls comes to acknowledge this fact, and that he does so in a much different fashion 
than the communitarians who focus on the good as the unifying nexus of communal 
political life. Given that Political Liberalism focuses on the fact that there is a plurality of 
different conceptions of the good that are possibly irreconcilable, Rawls faces the 
difficult problem of how to conceive of a stable society while at the same time taking a 
plethora of social groups and their members seriously. He expresses the problem of 
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political liberalism as: “How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and 
diverse society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines?” (PL xxv) For Rawls, solving this problem requires 
first and foremost not viewing political society as a community. So if Rawls indeed takes 
the fact of group membership seriously, he must do so in such a way that is compatible 
with individualism. His solution to this seeming contradiction is the overlapping 
consensus. Prior to discussing this solution, it is important to understand Rawls’ 
argument against the notion of political community.   
Rawls defines community as a “special kind of association, one united by a 
comprehensive doctrine” (PL 40 n.43). He argues that treating political society in terms 
of community contradicts the fact of pluralism—the fact that society is made up of a 
diversity of conceptions of the good. Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, citizens 
simply should not be expected to accept a single comprehensive doctrine. “If we think of 
political society as a community unified in affirming one and the same comprehensive 
doctrine, then the oppressive use of state power is necessary for political community” (PL 
37). This is the fact of oppression, and Rawls maintains that historical precedent for it 
was set during the Middle Ages and the Inquisition, in which the suppression of opinion 
and personal belief reigned supreme. So understanding political society in terms of a 
community requires the oppression of any commitments and opinions that deviate from 
the single comprehensive doctrine imposed by the community. Political community is 
inevitably unjust. Thus, Rawls demands that only a conception of justice that can be 
endorsed by all citizens can be justified.  
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 Rawls’ rejection of the idea of a political community should not be read as a 
denigration of community or group membership. Indeed, Rawls devises the overlapping 
consensus precisely in order to safeguard the coexistence of several social allegiances, 
groups, and communities from the fact of oppression, while at the same time allowing for 
the possibility of reasonable political agreement and stability. According to Rawls, 
political liberalism assumes that citizens have “two views: a comprehensive and a 
political view.” The political consists of the basic framework of social life, the values of 
justice, including equality and civil liberty, fair equality of opportunity, the values of 
economic reciprocity; and the social basis of mutual respect (PL 139). The 
comprehensive point of view consists of the personal, familial, and cultural values a 
person embraces, including her conception of the good as well as philosophical, moral, 
and religious doctrines. These two points of views must be understood separately or else 
the political could favor or establish a comprehensive doctrine and demand too much of 
its citizens who must endorse it. Thus, there are certain questions that should be solved 
only within the political sphere without reliance on any particular comprehensive 
doctrine (e.g. questions related to the liberty of conscious). Similarly, there are certain 
questions, which should be left to individuals to settle within their comprehensive 
doctrines (e.g. questions concerning the content of religious beliefs). 
The separate consideration of the two points of view should not be mistaken for 
their incommensurability. The political and comprehensive are complementary. While 
the political must never endorse a single comprehensive doctrine, many comprehensive 
doctrines could endorse the same political conception. Indeed, people’s reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines provide justification and support for political values. The 
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overlapping consensus is the intersection of all the political values that all reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines could agree to. Because the political view is freestanding, 
individuals are free to justify and support these political values from within their 
comprehensive doctrine. As Rawls states,  
The history of religion and philosophy shows that there are many reasonable ways 
in which the wider realm of values can be understood so as to be either congruent 
with, or supportive of, or else not in conflict with, the values appropriate to the 
special domain of the political as specified by a political conception of justice. 
(PL 140)  
 
For any conception of justice to be considered stable, it must be agreeable to all members 
of society, and it must be possible for this agreement to be entirely based on any given 
comprehensive doctrine (PL 143). Thus, the political view is a “module” that figures as 
an essential part of various reasonable comprehensive doctrines.  
So taking the “fact of group membership” seriously does not require considering 
political society as a community. Moreover, Rawls’ individualism does not come at the 
high cost of ignoring social and cultural life. If a comprehensive doctrine consists of a 
person’s religious, philosophical, or personal affiliations, then it is quite clear that 
sociality and group identification is central to Rawls’ understanding of human nature.  
Further, the political values that are the focus of the overlapping consensus are intended 
to guide the setting up of the basic structure of society. The role of the basic structure is 
to settle the question: “ by what principle can free and equal moral persons accept the fact 
that social and economic inequalities are deeply influenced by social fortune, and natural 
and historical happenstance?” (PL 281) So even the political content, which gains the 
agreement of people from diverse cultures, is social in nature and directed towards fairly 
settling deep social concerns. Rawls’ understanding of the social nature of human 
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relationships is observable in the difference principle, the basic structure of society, and 
in the political conception of the person as free and equal.7 
II. Kymlicka, Cultural Membership and Group Rights 
Kymlicka often lauds Rawls’ acknowledgement of the importance of culture. He 
agrees with Rawls that the idea of a political community imposes and assumes that 
society is culturally monolithic.8 Kymlicka’s project extends Rawlsian justice to those 
who have been excluded and treated unjustly as a result of their cultural identity. 
Minority cultures—defined by territorial concentration and shared language—have 
suffered egregious injustices as a result of the historical events of colonization and 
assimilation as well as political conventions that favor the majority culture by instituting 
majoritarian official languages and educational curricula, public holidays etc.9 While he 
notes that contemporary liberals are silent about the rights of minorities, Kymlicka often 
cites Rawls’ tendency to prioritize the important role of culture in individual liberty. 
However, Kymlicka is unsatisfied with Rawls’ failure to directly consider the rights of 
minority cultures. So he extends Rawls’ political liberalism to accommodate minority 
cultures through group rights. In response, I argue that Kymlicka takes too many liberties 
with central tenets in Rawls’ philosophy; his extension amounts to an appropriation. 
In Multicultural Citizenship Kymlicka suggests that Rawls implicitly 
acknowledges that societal culture is a “basic unit of liberal political theory.”10 Kymlicka 
suggests that he and Rawls share the assumption that membership in one’s own culture is 
of utmost importance to an individual’s life.  “According to Rawls, then, the ties to one’s 
culture are normally too strong to give up, and this is not to be regretted.”11 Arguably, 
Kymlicka takes some liberties here when he imbues Rawls’ view with the perspective 
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that cultural groups are the basic political unit. Social groups by way of comprehensive 
doctrines do figure strongly in the overlapping consensus, but it is not clear that they are 
more basic to the political conception than the political conception of the person. 
Regardless, it is important to note that Kymlicka and Rawls do seem to agree that culture 
is important for individuals. Rawls acknowledges the importance of culture ties and 
attachments to others within communities (PL 277). Similarly, Kymlicka argues that 
culture is the context of choice in people’s development of life plans. With this 
understanding of the role of culture, he makes two arguments for group-differentiated 
rights, which he takes to be a logical extension of Rawlsian justice.  
First, Kymlicka argues that Rawls’ theory should be extended to include minority 
cultural rights by considering culture as a primary good. He argues that “Rawls’s own 
argument for the importance of liberty as a primary good is also an argument for the 
importance of cultural membership as a primary good.”12 The analogy between cultural 
membership and liberty is drawn because Kymlicka understands both to serve as 
preconditions for carrying out a life plan. Culture provides the context of choice from 
which we create a life plan that is “worth carrying out,” just as liberty provides for our 
ability to pursue and revise our beliefs about value. Rawls’ leaving out of culture from his 
index of primary goods is a travesty: “It’s only through a rich and secure cultural 
structure that people can become aware in a vivid way, of the options available to 
them.”13 It is our culture that determines the range of options for such a plan. Kymlicka 
states, “We decide how to lead our lives by situating ourselves in these cultural 
narratives, by adopting roles that have struck us as worthwhile ones, as ones worth 
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living.”14 Thus, Kymlicka argues for extending Rawls’ list of primary goods to include 
culture as a context of choice. 
If culture is a primary good, then liberals should be deeply concerned about the 
status of cultures, which, if undermined, would jeopardize individuals’ ability to create a 
worthwhile live plan.15 Because minority cultures are disadvantaged and are in greater 
risk of loosing their culture all together, liberalism requires their protection. “Liberal 
values require both individual freedom of choice and a secure cultural context from 
which individuals can make their choices.”16 Thus, group-differentiated rights must be 
granted to minority cultures. Such rights could include rights to exemptions from policy, 
extra rights to representation, and the right to self-government.  
Second, Kymlicka offers the Equality Argument. He argues that minority cultures 
suffer the kinds of disadvantage that Rawls aims to equalize in his egalitarian theory of 
justice. Kymlicka argues that minority cultures or colonized indigenous cultures are 
disadvantaged because the dominant culture holds not only more political power, but also 
shares substantially more similarities with the political culture. Thus, the dominant 
culture receives majority rule on many political decisions that negatively affect minority 
cultures. For instance, minority cultures may be “outbid for important resources 
involving the land or means of production on which their community depends;” or 
minority cultures may be outvoted on crucial policy decisions such as what language will 
be used and “whether public works programs will support or conflict with aboriginal 
work patters.”17 Kymlicka offers group-differentiated rights as way to “compensate for 
the unequal circumstances, which put members of minority cultures at a systematic 
disadvantage in the cultural marketplace.”18 While he insists that group-differentiated 
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rights be enumerated on a case-by-case basis, he offers several examples, which include 
granting under-represented groups special rights to political representation.19 These 
include limiting the authority of the federal government by offering minority cultures 
self-government rights and the right to special exemptions from federal law.20  
There are important reasons why Kymlicka’s extension of Rawls is mistaken. It is 
problematic analytically, because it seems to contradict central tenets in Rawls’ theory. 
But it also leads to seemingly illiberal implications. Whether viewed in terms of culture 
as a primary good or in terms of the Equality Argument, group-differentiated rights have 
the serious illiberal consequence of limiting the individual’s power to change or redefine 
their culture.  
The Equality Argument assumes that cultural membership is an appropriate 
criterion for distributing political rights. This violates a central tenet in Rawls’ 
understanding of citizenship—citizenship is independent of comprehensive 
considerations. So civil rights are open equally to all, regardless of group membership. 
Further, it is not entirely clear why culture is the appropriate criterion for determining 
whose group deserves special rights. Kymlicka justifies his protection of culture based on 
equal respect for individuals. But it is not clear that group rights are capable of ensuring 
equality of respect. This is because Kymlicka assumes that what is good for the group is 
also good for the individuals within it. However, cultures are dynamic and marked by 
internal disagreements and power struggles even over cultural norms. So granting group 
rights is no way to ensure that all individuals’ contexts of choice are protected. It may 
even lead to or increase restrictions on the basic liberties of certain members of the 
group.21 
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In addition, considering culture as a primary good is inconsistent with Rawls’ 
understanding of culture and leads to absurd consequences. It is important to note here 
that Kymlicka’s inclination to amend primarily goods such that they include identity-
based context may have some merit. I explore this in Chapter 5. It is specifically 
Kymlicka’s inclusion of culture itself as a primary good that is problematic. Rawls does 
not consider culture to be a good that could be distributed. Like the two moral powers, 
having a culture is a basic characteristic of human life. As Appiah argues, considering 
culture as a primary good leads to strange circumstances, because culture is not a 
resource that can be distributed.22 You cannot have more or less culture. It is simply 
impossible to imagine a living human being without a culture, even if their culture is 
undergoing serious changes. So even if we granted Kymlicka’s allocation of culture as a 
primary good, it would be a completely uninteresting one. As John Tomasi states, 
“cultural membership is a primary good only in the same uninteresting sense as say, 
oxygen: since (practically) no one is differentially advantaged with respect to that good, it 
generates no special rights.”23  We could, however, get around this consequence by 
stipulating that stable culture is a primary good, as Kymlicka often ambiguously 
suggests. However, Tomasi holds that this leads to an unfortunate slippery slope that 
could justify group rights simply to protect the “character” of a community in the face of 
change. This would simply deny persons’ individual liberty to reaffirm them selves or to 
make intentional cultural changes.24  
III. Guidelines and Shortcomings 
In considering Rawls, Kymlicka’s argument for group-differentiated rights is 
simply unnecessary. An important guideline inherent in Rawls’ overlapping consensus 
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obviates the need for group rights. The overlapping consensus focuses on political values 
for the basic structure of society: equal political and civil liberty, fair equality of 
opportunity, the value of economic reciprocity, and the social values of mutual respect 
between citizens. Rawls demands that the basic structure of society is set up in such a 
way that it is fair to everyone, regardless of cultural membership. The political values at 
the focus of the overlapping consensus must be open to all equally, or else political 
liberalism fails to be just. Political liberalism is arbitrarily biased and unjust only if it fails 
to “specify fair background conditions wherein different conceptions of the good can be 
affirmed and pursued” (JF 156). Fairness demands that the basic structure of society 
maintains fair background conditions such that all citizens can foster whatever reasonable 
conceptions of the good they choose. This implicitly includes reasonable members of 
minority cultures.  
Many of Kymlicka’s concerns could be remedied through creating just institutions 
within the basic structure of society that do not violate the rights of individuals of 
minority cultures. Indeed, the two principles of justice “specify an ideal form for the 
basic structure” (PL 284). Each and every citizen deserves fair equality of opportunity. If 
some members in society have greater basic rights or greater opportunities than others, 
then these must be to the advantage of the least well off and “acceptable from their point 
of view” (JF 65). A notable issue with Rawls’ account is that he trades in ideal theory 
within an ideal account of what it would mean to be least advantaged. He admits, for 
example, that “the serious problems arising from existing discrimination” were left off 
the agenda of A Theory of Justice, and any enumeration of them in subsequent works 
certainly do not contain the detailed prescriptions Kymlicka wishes to see. However this 
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is not to say that their omission is a fault (JF 66). Rawls holds that justice as fairness 
“would certainly be seriously defective should [it] lack the resources to articulate the 
political values essential to justify the legal and social institutions needed to secure the 
equality of women and minorities” (JF 66). While the basic structure of society cannot 
secure group-differentiated-rights that ensure cultural survival or stability, it does require 
society to be fair such that all reasonable people are able to pursue their idea of good, no 
matter how they identify culturally.25  
At the same time as rights and liberties provide the capacity for every citizen to 
pursue their idea of the good the specification of some primary goods may be shaped by 
context. That is, opportunities, powers, and self-respect seem to rely heavily on the 
specificity of person’s identity and their cultural context. Culture itself is not a primary 
good as I have argued. The problem seems to be that primary goods are not flexible 
enough to account for the multifarious needs of minority cultures. Rawls comes up short 
in enumerating the primary goods because he fails to accommodate variations between 
individuals when he focuses primarily on an index practicable for social institutions (PL 
181). Kymlicka’s deep concerns about minority cultures could be remedied through 
amending Rawls’ enumeration of the primary goods. (See Chapter 5 below.) 
In addition, Rawls may come up short when it comes to cultural practices that by 
their very nature conflict with political liberalism. Rawls acknowledges that unreasonable 
comprehensive doctrines conflict with political liberalism, and he argues that these 
doctrines will simply fail to gain prominence in the well-ordered society. Reasonable 
persons seek fair terms of social cooperation with others and expect people to disagree 
about fundamental matters (PL 60-61). So they refrain from forcing their comprehensive 
                                                                                                   
 
47
views on other people. Unreasonable people, however, do not seek fair social cooperation 
and actively push their comprehensive doctrine on others. For Rawls, unreasonable 
comprehensive doctrines will simply become unpopular in a stable well-ordered society 
and go extinct.26 Until then, they are excluded from the political conception, and can be 
repressed (PL 61). There seems to be a serious shortcoming here for two reasons: first, 
Rawls’ insistence on exclusion may be too fast, and second, his criterion for 
reasonableness is too vague.  
First, Kymlicka argues that political liberalism fails to promote the liberalization 
of illiberal minority cultures. 27 For Rawls not all reasonable comprehensive doctrines are 
liberal. Illiberal comprehensive doctrines “can still be compatible for the right reasons 
with a liberal political conception” (PL xxxvii). Rawls sees no reason to assimilate 
reasonable illiberal cultures into liberalism, but does not argue for their exclusion 
either.28 In contrast, Kymlicka aims to actively liberalize such cultures.29 This seems to 
be an unnecessary imposition. Because a liberal political conception may be compatible 
with reasonable illiberal cultures, members of such cultures are seemingly willing to be 
exposed to liberal ideas on their own. There are of course unreasonable and illiberal 
comprehensive doctrines of cultures that Rawls would certainly exclude. And while 
Kymlicka doesn’t draw this distinction, we can assume that rather than allow 
unreasonable illiberal cultures to dissolve, he would argue that we ought to liberalize 
them. To do otherwise would be “illiberal,” “ethnocentric,” and “ahistorical.”30 It would 
suggest that cultures could not be reformed. Kymlicka argues firmly against not allowing 
such cultures to dissolve and requires that the cultures themselves remain intact during 
liberalization. But it is not clear that Kymlicka’s requirement to protect culture during 
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liberalization is even possible. Given that Kymlicka derives the right to culture from 
individual liberty and autonomy, he must also admit that the right to culture “entails the 
right to say ‘no’ to various cultural offers made by one’s upbringing, one’s nation, one’s 
religious or familial community.”31 He may have to admit that certain comprehensive 
doctrines (and thus, presumably, cultures) may go extinct as Rawls suggests as their own 
members come to take advantage of the right to exit. However, when it comes to 
comprehensive doctrines that Rawls would exclude from the get go, Kymlicka’s point is 
simply that we should do more before completely excluding them. For Kymlicka, this 
requires open engagement and willingness to teach people about liberal ideals. It is 
unclear how convincing this is. Given that many of the comprehensive doctrines that fit 
into these criteria are fundamentalist ones, they may be unwilling to receive Kymlicka’s 
education.32 
There may be another reason to be wary of excluding comprehensive doctrines 
too quickly: Rawls’ criteria to justify the exclusion of unreasonable persons are too 
vague. There are certainly clear cases of unreasonableness on Rawls’ account. Most 
people would welcome the exclusion of racist, sexist, homophobic, and otherwise 
oppressive views from the political conception. However, Marylyn Friedman worries that 
Rawls’ conception of unreasonableness cannot pick out the malign from the benign.33 
Rawls’ rubric for unreasonableness runs the risk of unjustifiably excluding historically 
disenfranchised people. “Some of the groups historically denied the rights and privileges 
of liberal citizenship were disenfranchised at least partly because they were regarded as 
poor reasoners, as people who could not achieve the detached impartiality needed to 
reflect the common good.”34 Among these groups are the poorest classes in society. 
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According to Friedman, the poor have been unjustly excluded from political participation 
due to the assumption on behalf of political theorists that they are “so absorbed with their 
own plights” that they cannot consider the wider public good.35 Friedman argues that they 
would count as unreasonable and run the risk of being excluded on Rawls’ criteria. 
Clearly, on Rawls’ own terms this would be a mistake.36 Rawls’ distinction between the 
reasonable and unreasonable seems to be flawed, and this may inhibit the extension of 
political and civil rights to some citizens. Further, it may unjustifiably exclude them from 
participating in the overlapping consensus, and thus they have no opportunity to endorse 
the political power that coerces them. The criteria for unreasonableness require some 
clarification to prevent untoward exclusions. 
Rawls, however, notes that he leaves his account of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines deliberately loose in order to “avoid excluding doctrines as unreasonable 
without strong grounds based on clear aspects of the reasonable itself. Otherwise our 
account runs the danger of being arbitrary and exclusive” (PL 59). So this shortcoming 
may prove to have an easy fix—namely loosening the criteria to account for when it is 
perfectly reasonable for people to press political aid for their plight, even at the expense 
of their impartiality. Moreover, it should be strongly noted in response to Friedman that 
Rawls’ intent in proffering the notion of reasonableness is to illustrate that the burdens of 
judgment in the political sphere require limiting what could be justified to others and 
specifying how it ought to be justified. That is, it specifies that reasonable persons must 
endorse some form of liberty of conscious and freedom of thought. According to Rawls, 
those who insist on using only a single comprehensive justification fail to endorse any 
form of liberty of conscious and freedom of thought (PL 61). It’s unclear whether any of 
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Friedman’s examples of vaguely “unreasonable” social positions explicitly fail to endorse 
these liberal values. So their exclusion may not be so inevitable on Rawls’ criteria.37  
While Kymlicka and Friedman’s arguments may not quite capture the uneasiness 
that piques in discussing the notion of reasonableness, it points us toward a deeper 
problem. Namely, the burdens of judgment limit justification to political reasons only. 
This limit may inadvertently exclude potentially reasonable novel or minority 
justifications. In addition such limitations may create difficulties with respect to the 
capacity of political liberalism to respond to conflicts between liberal institutions and 
cultures. The question of Rawls’ ability to help with struggles over identity depends 
strongly upon the extent to which political liberalism can provide guidance in dealing 
with the serious conflicts between cultural practices and quintessential liberal ideals. In 
the next chapter, this issue will be treated in greater detail in terms of the capacity of 
political liberalism to help with familial and gender issues in pluralist society. 
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CHAPTER 3 PUBLIC REASON, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 
 
 Feminist critics of liberal justice seek to dismantle the severe dichotomy between 
private and public. Susan Moller Okin points out that when political theorists reinforce 
this dichotomy, the family and the severe injustices and inequalities that often transpire 
there are shielded from public view.1 Thus the separate spheres tradition fails to 
recognize the extreme injustices perpetrated in the home, usually against women and 
children. Of course, the separate spheres tradition is by and large an anachronism. The 
twentieth century witnessed huge leaps forward in terms of extending justice into the 
private sphere, as many nations passed legislation to remedy the historical mistreatment 
of women and children. Regardless, Okin notes that prominent political theorists continue 
to leave familial and gender relations out. She states, “In the most influential of all 
twentieth-century theories of justice, that of John Rawls, family life is not only assumed, 
but is assumed to be just—and yet the prevalent gendered division of labor within the 
family is neglected, along with the associated distribution of power, responsibility and 
privilege.”2 Okin’s claim is that Rawls assumes that the familial is within the purview of 
justice, but he focuses only on an external view of the family as it relates as an institution 
to other institutions. Or he considers the family only through the perspective of the 
presumably male head of the household.3 She charges that Rawls neglects the internal 
dimension of the family itself, and worries that this tacitly ushers in a notion of separate 
spheres.4 
 Okin’s critique largely stems from A Theory of Justice, which Rawls admits was 
not explicit enough in establishing that justice as fairness implies equal rights for women 
as well as for men (PL 466). Rawls reasserts that the family is well within the realm of 
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the political as an institution of the basic structure of society, and makes quite clear how 
justice as fairness applies to the internal relations between family members (PL 466-474; 
JF 162-168). While this makes Rawls’ break with the separate spheres tradition 
abundantly clear, criticisms of the status of the family and of the so-called “private 
sphere” continue to flourish.5 Benhabib’s critique asserts that Rawls’ separation of the 
public political culture from the background culture is incoherent and unhelpful in the 
face of many inevitable conflicts within pluralist societies, several of which pertain 
directly to women and the family.  
Before describing and evaluating Benhabib’s critique, I explain Rawls’ defense of 
political liberalism against Okin’s charge. This requires a discussion of Rawls’ notion of 
public reason, its application in public political culture, and its incoherence in the 
background culture. With a clear idea of Rawls’ distinction in hand, I turn to Benhabib’s 
criticism. After some conceptual clarification, I argue that a mutual elucidation of Rawls 
and Benhabib on these issues may be possible. The two thinkers share an important 
guideline for life in pluralist society. Where they differ, I find an important shortcoming 
in Rawls’ view, but it is not as severe as Benhabib charges.  
I. Rawls’ Public Reason and the Family 
 Rawls’ discussion of the family has two edges. First, it directly responds to 
Okin’s main concerns regarding the applicability of political justice to the internal 
relations of the family. Second, his discussion of the family serves as an example for the 
wide extent and application of public reason. “The range of questions about the family 
covered by this political conception will indicate the ample space for debate and 
argument comprehended by public reason as a whole” (PL 467). The two edges are 
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importantly connected, because the application of public reason to the family requires 
that it be included within political justice (PL 478). I discuss Rawls’ response to Okin and 
explain how it figures as an exemplar for public reason.  
 Ever since A Theory of Justice, Rawls has included the family as part of the basic 
structure of society. The family is well within the range of application of the principles of 
justice.6 Okin notes that the initial inclusion is “surprising in light of the history of liberal 
thought.” She adds that this places Rawls’ commitment to the “public/domestic 
dichotomy momentarily in doubt.”7 However, the family and its members are largely 
absent from the rest of Theory, and Okin argues that Rawls’ assumption that families are 
just institutions is a glaring flaw. Some families are not just; they are relics of “caste or 
feudal societies.”8 The worry here is that justice does not apply to families internally. As 
Rawls clarifies in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” justice applies to social 
arrangements, but not directly to the internal business and internal life of associations (PL 
468). So political principles do not constrain the internal lives of families with respect to 
their cultural or religious atmosphere. However, the principles of justice do impose 
constraints on the family in order to guarantee the basic rights, liberties, freedoms and 
opportunities of its members (PL 469). Rawls states, “Just as the principles of justice 
require that wives have all the rights of citizens, the principles of justice impose 
constraints on the family on behalf of children, who as society’s future citizens, have 
basic rights as such” (PL 470). He goes on to argue for the requisite reforms in family 
law needed to counteract the “long and historical injustice to women.” Thus, Okin’s 
concern that Rawlsian justice fails to reach the family is aptly treated. 
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 Additionally, Rawls clearly rejects the separate spheres tradition: “when political 
liberalism distinguishes between political justice that applies to the basic structure and 
other conceptions of justice that apply to the various associations within that structure, it 
does not regard the political and the nonpolitical domains as two separate, disconnected 
spaces, each governed solely by its own distinct principles” (PL 470). While the various 
associations may adopt internal criteria for justice based on comprehensive doctrines, 
Rawls is clear that the members of such associations are “citizens first” (Pl 471). 
Institutions cannot violate anyone’s rights as citizens. Justice has broad application such 
that there is no sphere of society to which it could not apply. “If the so called private 
sphere is alleged to be a space exempt from justice, then there is no such thing” (PL 471).  
However, the extent and power of a political conception of justice is more limited 
than Okin would have it. Rawls argues that justice may allow for traditional divisions of 
labor in families so long as it is “voluntary and does not result from or lead to injustice” 
(PL 471).9 Okin, may not be satisfied with this because she is convinced that the family 
itself is an unjust institution, and the “lynchpin” of gender related injustices.10 So she 
attempts to utilize Rawls’ principles of justice to alter the gendered division of labor and 
argue for the abolishment gender all together. This seems to be quite an extension and 
may amount to an unwarranted appropriation.11 Regardless, it is enough for my purposes 
to show that Rawlsian justice does impose certain constraints on the internal life of the 
family. There will be more to say about the extent of its application in Section II.  
 Since the family is seen as a matter of political justice, public reason applies to it. 
Prior to showing how the enumeration of the values of public reasons attached to the 
family exemplifies the breadth of public reason, it is necessary to discuss how Rawls 
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defines public reason. “The idea of public reason specifies at the deepest level the basic 
moral and political values that are to determine a constitutional democratic government’s 
relation to its citizens and their relationship to one another” (PL 441-442). Importantly, 
public reason does not apply to all of the public political culture, it only applies to 
questions of the public political forum: judges, government officials, and candidates for 
public office.12 He distinguishes parts of public discussion for the purpose of allowing for 
the acknowledgement of important differences in the political sphere. For instance, 
“between a religious leader’s preaching or promoting pro-life organization and leading a 
major political movement or running for political office” (PL 443). Maintaining this 
distinction allows Rawls to narrow the content and rules for justification in the political 
sphere without constraining the freedoms of different comprehensive views in civil 
society. The religious leader can preach however she likes. However, the leaders of 
political movements and candidates for public office must offer “public reasons” for their 
claims. For Rawls, political liberalism requires that “public reasons” support our 
justifications for any claims that may come to underscore important and possibly binding 
political decisions. The political values of public reason characterize political institutions 
and it characterizes citizen’s reasoning about constitutional essentials (PL 441, 448).13  
Public reason is incoherent when applied to what Rawls calls “the background 
culture.” “This is the culture of civil society” (PL 443). It includes churches, associations, 
institutions, and institutions of learning at all levels (PL 443, n13). Public reason could 
not apply to the background culture of civil society because it is made up of so many 
different ideas that citizens could not possibly agree on. That is, unlike the political, it is 
not guided by any one idea or conception, which all citizens can affirm. Nor should the 
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background culture be expected to agree about such ideas, given the fact of reasonable 
pluralism. Like the preacher in the example above, when not making political claims, 
citizens can justify themselves however they like. 
Regardless of the specific content of public reason, Rawls does not wish to 
construe it too narrowly. Its application to familial issues serves to demonstrate the wide 
range of public reason. He lists the values of public reason which cover the family: “the 
freedom and equality for women, the equality of children as future citizens, the freedom 
of religion,” and “the value of the family in securing the orderly production and 
reproduction of society and of its culture from one generation to the next” (PL 474). The 
application of public reason to the family exemplifies the way in which political values 
that apply to the single institution of the basic structure also “cover” many of society’s 
institutions and associations (PL 474). They cover those elements of persons that are 
always politically protected: persons’ freedom, equality, freedom of thought and 
conscience, etc. And they apply insofar as the institution plays an important role in 
reproducing the political culture over time, e.g., educational institutions. Public reason 
has a wide range of application, and could help in many conflicts. Rawls concludes in a 
letter to his editor at Columbia University Press in 1998: “thus public reason and political 
liberalism have considerable relevance to highly contested questions of our contemporary 
word” (PL 438). 
II. Benhabib, the Deliberative Model and Civil Society 
 Rawls’ discussion of public reason, its application to the public political culture, 
and its incoherence in the background culture inspires many questions. There may be 
room to doubt Rawls’ optimism about the relevance of public reason and political 
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liberalism to the deep conflicts inevitable in contemporary society. Benhabib argues that 
the “separation between the background culture and the public political culture, attractive 
as it may be, is institutionally unstable and analytically untenable.”14 Indeed, she asserts 
that political liberalism is incapable of dealing with the inevitable clashes, in a multi-
faith, multicultural, multiethnic society, which emerge among “the highly contested 
questions of our contemporary world” (PL 438). Several of these contestations involve 
women, children, and the family, including: “gender equality, bodily integrity, freedom 
of the person, education of children, and the practices of certain minority cultures.”15 
According to Benhabib, Rawls fails to provide guidance on how to reestablish consensus 
in the event of such clashes. His idea of public reason is too restrictive to foster the open 
conversations required to aid in the interpretation and application of constitutional 
essentials.16  
For Benhabib, political liberalism is too permissive and too prohibitive when it 
comes to cultural practices. While this may seem to be a contradiction at first glance, the 
underlying problem regards the extent to which citizens are capable of discussing such 
issues in public in a politically salient manner. It is important to note that Benhabib is not 
making a substantive critique about limiting or allowing certain cultural practices. As she 
states, “It is the normative model of public reason that I am critiquing.”17 So it is not the 
case that she would advocate for the loosening or tightening of restrictions against 
cultural practices that could negatively affect women and children. Rather, Benhabib is 
arguing for citizens’ ability to publically and politically deliberate on such rights, 
especially during times of deep conflict.  
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Rawls’ political liberalism is too permissive because certain issues get “pushed 
into the private sphere and precluded from consideration.”18 Like, Okin, Benhabib is 
concerned that some practices within the family will fail to be addressed by political 
liberalism because they are “privatized.” This seems possible on Rawls’ revised reading 
of the family, because political liberalism does not require the reordering of gendered 
divisions of labor in the family. Further, Rawls differentiates between political and moral 
autonomy. In A Theory of Justice, justice as fairness considers persons in terms of their 
moral autonomy, as sources of valid moral claims. However, in Political Liberalism, 
Rawls worried that this conception of personhood asks too much of comprehensive 
doctrines that appeal to higher authorities and may not value moral autonomy. So Rawls 
offers, instead, political autonomy, and he understands persons according to the political 
conception of persons as free and equal.19 Benhabib worries that political liberalism 
would allow hierarchical subordination within the family, which could allow for the 
oppression of women’s moral autonomy. Allowable subordinations could include not 
allowing daughters to attend school or prohibiting them from freely choosing their 
careers or marriage partners. These oppressions would be allowed in private, on 
Benhabib’s reading of Rawls, so long as women’s political autonomy was upheld 
publically. Public political conversations regarding the morality and justness of such 
practices would be precluded. Benhabib worries such practices could continue in silence 
within the background culture of civil society.  
For Benhabib, Rawls is too permissive of harmful cultural practices in the family, 
because public reason and the principles of justice do not apply so long as the 
requirement of political autonomy is met for all family members. However, Rawls uses 
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the family as the exemplar for how far public reason can reach. So while Benhabib and 
Rawls might disagree about the nature of autonomy, Rawls only allows those traditional 
practices to continue in the family that are “voluntary” and do not stem from or cause 
injustice. There may be plenty of room to discuss whether Rawls’ notion of voluntariness 
is strong enough when compared to moral autonomy. Regardless, justice does in fact 
apply to many of the cases that concern Benhabib. Several public reasons are available 
for such public political discussions, including equal opportunity, freedom of religion, 
and others.   
Benhabib’s stronger critique regards Rawls’ inability to allow for wide and open 
public political discussions about not only the constitutional essentials themselves, but 
also about the cultural practices that may (inevitably) contradict them in multicultural 
society. Constitutional essentials include the general structure of government and the 
political process as well as equal rights and liberties of citizenship, such as the right to 
vote, the right to participate in politics, liberty of conscience, freedom of thought and 
association, and the rule of law (PL 227). Benhabib suggests that political liberalism is 
too prohibitive with respect to cultural practices, which directly conflict with 
constitutional essentials. “For example, political liberalism could not permit marriage 
between non-consenting minors; nor condone the sale of young women by their families 
for prostitution; nor accept the infliction of irreversible bodily wounds…”20 Because the 
constitutional essentials presuppose the illegitimacy of certain cultural practices from the 
start, Benhabib worries that the emerging conflict could never be appropriately 
adjudicated in political liberalism. There is simply too much disagreement about the 
constitutional essentials themselves for Rawls’ restricted view of public reason to be 
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helpful, and there simply are no public reasons available for people to defend or explain 
their cultural practices.21 For example, when asked about why they condone practices of 
unilateral polygamy and divorce (which privilege the male), “The most frequent reasons 
that women themselves give as an answer is that this is their tradition and their way of 
life.”22 This is not a public reason on Rawls’ criterion. But it is a good reason that should 
be considered politically. Thus, Benhabib labels public reason as a restricted agenda: It 
operates as a regulative standard rather than as a deliberative process and it considers 
only basic political issues and constitutional essentials, which contain a cultural bias.  
In response, I offer two caveats about public reason, which may weaken this 
criticism, however slightly. First, a fundamental disagreement between Rawls and 
Habermas as well as Benhabib concerns the origin of the principles of justice themselves. 
For Habermas, Rawls’ appeal to liberal rights and principles that “have a status prior to 
the democratic process” prohibits citizens from being able “to see all their political 
principles, even those establishing individual rights, as rooted in their autonomous 
political will.”23 Habermas further states that because Rawls’ principles of justice emerge 
from a hypothetical contract situation in the original position, “citizens are unable to 
‘reignite the radical democratic embers…in the civic life of their society.”24 I do not 
intend to respond to the famous Rawls-Habermas debate here. However, it is important to 
note that many of these issues are at stake when Benhabib worries public reason is an 
imposed standard, rather than an ongoing process. Benhabib’s concern is that people 
involved in debates over constitutional essentials are not able to autonomously agree to 
the political values and principles that guide public reason. Her deliberative model, 
instead, invites and considers a plurality of public reasons.  
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Rawls, of course, does understand citizens to have endorsed public reason insofar 
as he requires them to meet the criterion of reciprocity as it is expressed in public reason. 
The criterion requires that  
Citizens are to conduct their public political discussions of constitutional 
essentials and matters of basic justice within the framework of what each 
sincerely regards as a reasonable political conception of justice, a conception that 
expresses political values that others as free and equal might also be expected to 
reasonably endorse. (PL xlviii)  
 
Further, Rawls came to be quite open with respect to how these principles are to be 
identified. He gestures to a “family” of such ideas that can meet the criterion of 
reciprocity, and so he does not insist that his own contractarian methods are required to 
do justice. So while public reason and the criterion of reciprocity is a standard that 
governs public deliberations, it also could be understood as a process. Rawls is explicit 
when he stipulates that public reason and the principles, ideals and standards that it 
appeals to must change over time. “Social changes over generations also give rise to new 
groups with different political problems” (PL li). He cites race, gender, and ethnicity as 
examples. So it may not be that public reason and its application in public political 
culture is so inflexible as to be restrictive in application. 
Additionally, Benhabib may worry that Rawls’ limitation of public reason to 
issues of constitutional essentials restricts discussion in civil society. It is important to 
note, that on Rawls’ distinction between public political culture and the background 
culture this is explicitly not the case. Rawls makes clear that asserting the “need for full 
and open discussion in the backgrounds culture” must not be confused with the rejection 
of the idea public reason (PL 444). Indeed, he notes in response to Benhabib’s prior 
work, that her view is perfectly consistent--indeed “hard to distinguish”--from political 
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liberalism, because she advocates for a model of deliberation in the public sphere a là 
Habermas. The public sphere is compatible with political liberalism along with several 
other conceptions of civil society. Since the ideal of public reason does not apply to the 
background culture of civil society, her worries about public reason, according to Rawls, 
have no bearing on her argument for how deliberation should go in civil society (PL 451 
n.28). In civil society, citizens can deliberate about whatever they like, and offer 
whatever reasons they see fit according to their comprehensive doctrines. Rawls’ view on 
civil society is, then, more unrestricted than Benhabib’s argument that the norms of 
discourse ethics must apply to it.  
The consequence of the lack of restriction in civil society is that important 
limitations are placed on public reason. An over-encompassing ideal of public reason 
would narrow freedoms in civil society by proscribing certain ways of thinking or types 
of speech. For Rawls, for example, when a Supreme Court Justice considers an opinion 
on sex discrimination, she should appeal to the political value that men and women are 
equal as citizens.25 She should not, however appeal to the notion that men and women are 
equal by nature or in a metaphysical sense. This is an appeal to a comprehensive notion; 
one opposed in many churches and others in the background culture. No doubt this 
proposition is controversial, but as Nussbaum suggests, it shows “people the respect of 
letting them sort out for themselves how to integrate their political and moral ideals.”26 
And this brings us to Benhabib’s deeper point. She seems to argue that political 
theorists themselves have a duty to help “sort out” the relationship between the political 
principles and the background culture of civil society.  
[I]n Rawls’ theory there is a certain impatience in analyzing the relationship 
between liberal political principles and the background culture. This dismissive 
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attitude toward the work of culture in liberal politics and society produces a 
stunted vision of democracy and the relationship between legislative action and 
democratic struggle.27  
 
Indeed, Rawls seems to leave such analysis to people to figure out for themselves. 
Benhabib’s main concern regards the “space” in which public reason applies. It is in what 
she calls the public sphere that moral and political debates take place, and discussions 
that occur there are often important politically. Thus, Benhabib argues that Rawls 
overlooks both the political difficulties and the political opportunities present in the 
background culture of civil society.   
III. Guidelines and Shortcomings 
Benhabib points to a shortcoming in Rawls. Namely, he restricts public reason to 
fundamental political questions and constitutional essentials. This restricted domain is 
troubling because it unduly limits the range of political discussion on constitutional 
essentials to the public political forum. That is, restrictive public reason limits public 
deliberation to those questions before the legislature, judges, political candidates, and 
voters. The restricted domain serves to ignore a swath of serious cultural issues in civil 
society that, per Benhabib, ought to be politically considered. Of course, Rawls stipulates 
that issues in civil society could be treated however one likes. However, it is not clear 
that he gives sufficient reason to maintain the limitation of public reason to such 
fundamental questions. For that matter, as Patrick Neal points out, he does not seem to 
even firmly hold the limit.28 Rawls notes, “Most political questions do not concern 
fundamental matters,” and he lists examples: legislation, property regulations, 
environmental protections, wilderness preservation and land conservation, and funding 
for the arts (PL 214). He then immediately goes on to say that they may involve 
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fundamental matters, and if they do public reason may apply to them less strictly. So the 
shortcoming is caused in part by conceptual ambiguity.  
I will pursue clarification of this conceptual ambiguity and point out subsequent 
shortcomings along the way. Doing so will provide clarity for articulating the guideline 
inherent in public reason: public (political) deliberation ought to proceed according to 
shared political values. This is a strong Rawlsian guideline. But it is accompanied by the 
unfortunate and unnecessary shortcoming that important nonpublic reasons are neglected. 
By way of clarification, Rawls offers three interpretations of public reason, 
including a wider view, which leaves only a very thin distinction between the background 
culture of civil society and the public political culture. According to the exclusive 
interpretation of public reason a person “oversteps the bounds of public reason” when 
they bring comprehensive, religious or secular, reasons into political debates.”29  Or as 
Rawls states: “On fundamental political matters, reasons given explicitly in terms of 
comprehensive doctrines are never to be introduced into public reason” (italics added PL 
247). The exclusive interpretation of public reason only involves citizens as voters, 
legislators, officials or judges when they discuss fundamental issues that will come or 
could come to have the force of law.30 Justification of such decisions must come from a 
common political point of view, and the political values to which public reason refers 
reflects this point of view. So on the exclusive view when Martin Luther King Jr. quoted 
the gospel while arguing for the end segregation he oversteped public reason.31 
Benhabib’s argument about the limits of Rawls’ division of public space has quite a lot of 
force against this interpretation. It is clearly too restrictive both on the kinds of reasons 
that people can meaningfully endorse to support political terms and also on the range 
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possible topics of political conversation on fundamental issues. However, Rawls did not 
see the exclusive interpretation as the only way. Indeed, he argued it had relevance only 
in the ideal well-ordered society; ideal consensus would obviate the need for public 
debates.  
Rawls pits the second, inclusive view, directly against the exclusive view and 
claims that “under different political and social conditions, the [ideal of public reason] 
must surely be advanced and fulfilled in different ways” (PL 248). The inclusive view 
recognizes that “when a society is deeply at odds with itself about constitutional 
essentials…there exists no generally accepted language of public reason.”32 In such 
situations, citizens can bring their comprehensive reasons to bear on political decisions 
only if they believe that society would become more just because of it (PL 247, 251). 
Rawls offers the abolitionists, who argued that slavery was contrary to God’s law, as an 
example. The abolitionists of the antebellum South could not appeal to The Constitution 
of their time in order to make an argument against slavery. They lived in an unjust 
society. Their nonpublic reason was all they had to rely on to bring about social justice 
(PL 249). On the inclusive view, these nonpublic reasons are well within the bounds of 
public reason, even if they could never become public reasons themselves. “The 
comprehensive reasons they appealed to were required to give sufficient strength to the 
political conception to be subsequently realized” (PL 251). Thus Rawls explicitly states 
that public reason is not limited to the law and statutes. It is limited instead by the “ideal 
of democratic citizens trying to conduct their political affairs on terms supported by 
public values” (PL 253). On the inclusive view, comprehensive reasons are welcome in 
political debates during times of conflict over constitutional essentials. Some of the issues 
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that Benhabib raises could fall under the domain of public reason, even if they contradict 
constitutional essentials. Appealing to a plurality of reasons, even religious or cultural 
ones, may be required to change or expand the constitutional essentials in question. This 
responds to a portion of Benhabib’s concern, although she certainly might wonder why 
the background culture of civil society is ignored during other times, when extreme 
conflict can emerge in the interpretation and application of existing constitutional 
essentials or over nonfoundational issues.  
In the third interpretation of public reason, Rawls modifies his inclusive view of 
public reason. He calls this the “wide view of public reason” (PL l).33 On this view, 
citizens can bring comprehensive explanations and justifications into the political debates 
about constitutional essentials at any time so long as the proviso requirement is met (PL 
463). The proviso requires that citizens justify their claims with public reasons ”in due 
course.” (PL l). Rawls seems to be intentionally vague about when a person would have 
to provide the proviso. He does so on my reading to make room for debates driven by 
nonpublic reason during time of injustice. He states, “I do not know whether the 
Abolitionists and King ever fulfilled the proviso” (PL l n.27). It is abundantly clear; he 
goes on to say, “they could have” (Pl l n.27).  
The proviso is what makes public political culture distinct from the background 
culture of civil society. This is a notably thinner boundary than Rawls is often considered 
to make. It certainly seems thinner than Benhabib’s concerns intimate. Indeed, he seems 
to almost completely open the public political culture to the background culture. For this 
reason, the wide view of public reason is controversial among political liberals. Charles 
Larmore argues that Rawls was “misled by his own terminology” when he invites the 
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“freewheeling arguments” of the background culture into the public political culture.34 
Larmore sees this as a mistake. The wide view of public reason, according to Larmore, 
virtually collapses the boundary between public political culture and the background 
culture, and he fear this will weaken the public justification for coercive decisions. 
Larmore’s concern is certainly important. However, I think that Rawls’ wide view of 
public reason has important merits. It would allow for a richer analysis of the seemingly 
ambiguous relationship between the political and civil society. It could be that Rawls 
simply came to see public political culture as a roomy place, open to deliberations over 
emergent issues in the public life of democracies.  Indeed, the wide view opens political 
discussion up to many of the controversial issues that have traditionally been kept silent, 
as Benhabib, Okin, and many other feminist critics of justice charge. 
Yet the proviso is Rawls’ final connection to the boundary between the public 
political culture and the background culture. And Benhabib may still argue that requiring 
the proviso could close many opportunities for “genuine deliberation” about changing 
cultural understandings. She argues that any deliberative model must acknowledge and 
actively invite a “plurality of public reasons,” which would allow for wider discussion in 
the public sphere.35 Thus, a shortcoming in Rawls is that the proviso requirement alone is 
not sufficient for inviting and encouraging the political discussion of issues in the 
background culture of civil society. Indeed, Rawls seems to prefer to let such issues be 
settled in civil society. But this impatience, as Benhabib calls it, for analyzing the 
relationship between the background culture of civil society and the public political 
culture may in effect be a cold shoulder to contentious clashes that deserve political 
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attention. “Culture matters; cultural evaluations are deeply bound up with our 
interpretations of our needs, our visions of the good life, and our dreams for the future.”36  
For example, Benhabib considers the scarf affair in which the French state 
intervened on behalf of Muslim girls, who wore headscarves to school. The state did so, 
according to Benhabib to “dictate more autonomy and egalitarianism” in the public 
sphere.37 The French public education system assumed that the girls’ act was one of 
subservience to the patriarchal structures of their religion. Assuming their actions were 
religious ones, the state penalized them, rather than encouraging “discourses among 
youth about what it means to be a Muslim citizen in a laic French Republic.”38 However, 
Benhabib suggests that had the girls’ reasons been publically heard, the action of the state 
would have proven seriously misdirected. Indeed, “it would have become clear that the 
meaning of wearing the scarf itself was changed from a religious act to one of cultural 
defiance and increasing politicization.”39 The state unintentionally restricted the girls’ 
capacity to define their actions for themselves. During times in which many cultures are 
undergoing transitions, the state must be ready to hear the plurality of reasons for 
peoples’ practices and actions lest it fail to discern which political values are in question. 
Rawls comes up short when he cannot provide a positive attempt to hear, consider, and 
engage nonpublic reasons about constitutional essentials, even if they do not have the 
final say in political decisions.  
Are the proviso requirement and open political discourse mutually exclusive? It 
does not seem to be the case that the proviso necessarily requires public reason at the 
expense of actively encouraging and inviting the expression of nonpublic reasons. It 
simply excludes those reasons that would not be agreeable to citizens of a pluralist 
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society—“those who believe that fundamental political questions should be decided by 
what they regard as the best reasons according to their own idea of the whole truth” (PL 
447). Such fundamentalism is simply inconsistent with democratic citizenship and could 
not meet the criterion of reciprocity. Unless they are fundamentalist, when people offer 
tradition and religion as reasons to justify their practices, it is most likely the case that a 
public reason is available to accompany it, religious freedom and liberty of conscience 
come to mind. If there are clashes to which no political values apply, then citizens have 
deliberative work to do in sorting out more just constitutional essentials.  
In effect, the proviso requirement provides a helpful guide for political 
conversations by requiring the appeal to common political values. Public reasons may 
help to shape fundamental institutions and “to protect the basic liberties and to prevent 
social and economic inequalities from being excessive” (Pl lvii). As a form of public 
political deliberation, public reason helps to foster the political relation of civic 
friendship. Benhabib seems to share this view when she offers the deliberative model as a 
way to shape the public practices and habits of citizens as autonomous participants in the 
deliberative process. Additionally, like Rawls, she also appeals broadly to “political” 
values when she argues that deliberative norms must proceed according to the “guarantee 
of basic human, civil and political rights.”40  
Insofar as the proviso refers to political values that the public could agree to, I 
suggest that the proviso itself represents a guideline for life in pluralist society. Public 
reason sets a bottom-line requirement to respect the basic rights and liberties of persons 
when it comes to binding political decisions. Further, as Benhabib says, Rawls’ political 
liberalism views “the legitimation of political power and the examination of the justice of 
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institutions to be a public process, open to all citizens.”41 Life in a pluralist democratic 
society requires that the political process remain open to the scrutiny, examination, and 
reflection of citizens in deliberation (PL lvii).42 With the idea of public reason, Rawls 
requires that political decisions be made according to premises to which all citizens could 
freely agree upon and which demand equal respect for others via the criterion of 
reciprocity. 
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PART II: AMENDMENTS AND EXTENSIONS OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
  
 In Part One, I approached the question of whether Rawls can help with struggles 
over identity through an interpretative approach that attempted to strike the difficult 
balance between individuals’ pursuit of meaningful and flourishing identities and the 
stability of the society we live in. I find that although there are shortcomings, Rawls’ 
political conception offers such a balanced view. Part Two suggests an amendment and 
an extension of Rawls’ political liberalism in order to strengthen this balance.  
My focus here concerns two issues that came up repeatedly in Part One. First, 
Rawls’ distinction between the political and the comprehensive seems to be too rigid to 
be helpful in finding political solutions to struggles over identity that pertain to religious, 
cultural, and familial issues. Instead of simply leveling Rawls distinction and bridging 
this gap, Chapter 4 seeks to establish and maintain the political/comprehensive 
distinction. In an effort to maintain the vitality of the political conception, I argue for 
amending it without diminishing it. I shall illustrate how Rawls’ political conception 
could be improved if it were more inviting towards the concerns and demands of 
identities. Second, Rawls’ enumeration of the primary goods plays an important role in 
the extent to which the Rawlsian state could meet the needs of a diversity of citizens and 
help them to foster ethical identities. However, his political enumeration of the primary 
goods places serious limitations not only on how the Rawlsian state understands its 
citizens, but also on the state’s ability to do justice by meeting certian basic needs. 
Chapter 5 argues for an extension of Rawls’ primary goods in such a way as to 
acknowledge the diversity of citizens’ needs as a matter of identity and capability. My 
suggestions may seem too meager to make a tremendous difference. My attempt here is 
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meant to reflect the care and consideration that is required to appropriately balance the 
seemingly disparate relationship between of individuals and society
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CHAPTER 4: THE DEMANDS OF COMPREHENSIVE REASONS 
 
Throughout this thesis I have argued that in order to adequately help with 
struggles over identity Rawls must provide a space for comprehensive reasons in all 
political considerations. I have endeavored to show that Rawls offers political guidance 
on many of the issues faced by pluralist society regarding social identity, culture, and the 
family. However, he comes up short when his political conception seems to exclude 
comprehensive doctrines. If Rawls’ political liberalism could be helpful to these struggles 
and those to come, it must foster a public political culture open to hearing the legitimate 
claims and concerns of comprehensive doctrines. My suggestions have included doing so 
by way of recognizing the demands of nonpolitical identity and by actively inviting 
concerns of comprehensive doctrines and nonpolitical identity into political debates about 
constitutional essentials.  
For some it may seem patently impossible to suggest that Rawls could invite 
nonpolitical identity into the political as I am recommending. Indeed, it is tempting to 
charge that the overlapping consensus, and subsequently public reason, confines political 
debates to the values that citizens could share: political values.1 Charles Larmore labels 
this the straitjacketed view of political debate.2 He argues that it is simply not Rawls’ 
view. Indeed, Rawls allows for open and unrestricted discussions on political issues that 
do not involve the constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice. Further, 
Larmore argues that the straitjacketed view is unappealing (and would be for Rawls) for 
three reasons. First, citizens need to know each other and understand each other’s 
convictions about controversial issues. We need to do so in order to debate with each 
other at all, but we also need to do so in order to establish the confidence that we could 
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agree to a common point of view. Second, exposure to the ideas and views of others may 
persuade one to change her mind about her own view, or it may simply strengthen or 
clarify her understanding of her doctrine. Third, people must be allowed and able to 
freely and openly exchange their ideas about the good.3  
So on Rawls’ view people should have wide and unrestricted conversations about 
many political issues that appeal to their comprehensive doctrines and thus to their 
identity. However, when it comes to issues of constitutional essentials and question of 
basic justice, Rawls requires that the conversation be more or less restricted to public 
reason. My goal in this chapter will be to support Rawls’ motivation in restricting the 
conversation on these matters, but I also argue that doing so need not be done at the 
exclusion of comprehensive reasons.  Rawls’ political conception could be amended in 
such a way that it is capable of taking seriously comprehensive reasons and guiding 
citizens in learning about each other in open political exchange. 
I consider two places where Rawls considers nonpolitical identity and 
comprehensive doctrines, but insufficiently. First, nonpolitical identities by way of the 
comprehensive doctrines play an important role in the endorsement of the political values 
in the overlapping consensus. Second, comprehensive doctrines may be included in 
political deliberations over constitutional essentials at any time so long as they are 
accompanied by public reasons under the proviso requirement (See Chapter 3 above). I 
will discuss each of these in turn. I then offer ways in which Rawls’ theory can be 
amended such that comprehensive doctrines, and thus nonpolitical identity, play an 
adequate role in both the endorsement and justification of political values and in political 
deliberations.  
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I. The Overlapping Consensus and Stability for the Right Reasons 
 Comprehensive doctrines have an undoubtedly important role in endorsing the 
political conception in an overlapping consensus. I explore in this section how Rawls 
understands this endorsement as it relates to stability for the right reasons. I then pose the 
objection that Rawls’ inclusion of the comprehensive doctrines is insufficient because 
their role diminishes once the overlapping consensus is established.  
Rawls’ overlapping consensus is an attempt to illustrate the possibility that 
reasonable democratic citizens could endorse a liberal conception of justice for moral 
reasons. This is not an easy task. As Freeman points out “Even if we want to cooperate 
on terms others can accept, toleration for moral reasons of other’s speech and ways of life 
we find morally and religiously repugnant can seem to be a peculiar position.”4 In this 
sense, the possibility of the overlapping consensus is both hopeful and pessimistic. It is 
hopeful because it seeks to establish political values that people can share across 
tremendous cultural, religious, philosophical, and moral differences, and seemingly 
irreconcilable disagreements. It is pessimistic because it assumes that once the consensus 
is established there need not be improvements in our social relations with each other: we 
could continue feeling disgusted or hateful towards each other in perpetuity. I shall focus 
on Rawls’ hopeful solution to the problem of discovering shared values amongst extreme 
differences. I then discuss what I take to be pessimism as my critique of the insufficient 
consideration of identity in the overlapping consensus.  
An overlapping consensus is possible only if people are able to agree to it for their 
own moral reasons.  
All those who affirm the political conception start from within their own 
comprehensive view and draw on the religious, philosophical and moral grounds 
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it provides. The fact that people affirm the same political conception on those 
grounds does not make their affirming it any less religious, philosophical, or 
moral, as the case may be, since the grounds sincerely held determined the nature 
of their affirmation. (PL 148) 
 
Importantly, comprehensive doctrines do not have to be of a similar nature or creed to 
endorse the political conception. Rather, Rawls argues that people’s motivation to 
endorse the political conception comes from their own understanding of the good. At the 
same time, Rawls conjectures that citizens will incorporate support for just institutions 
into their own conceptions of the good and that doctrines will “evolve” to endorse the 
liberal conceptions of justice while living within a just society.5  
The endorsement of the political conception of justice on behalf of citizens for 
their own moral reasons leads to stability for the right reasons. I shall compare the 
stability of the overlapping consensus to two methods of acquiring stability for the wrong 
reasons. First, the social world could be managed exclusively according to shared 
political values, united by a single comprehensive view. Second, a once contentious 
social world could find stability as a matter of compromise resulting from exhaustion in 
the face of violent conflict, or even “mortal combat.”6 Rawls rejects both of these 
extremes. For our day and age, the first is too coercive, and given the fact of pluralism, 
can only be maintained by the oppressive use of state power. The second, also known as a 
modus vivendi, is both too precarious and too hopeless. It is too precarious because it 
results from a compromise on political values, rather than a full-fledged endorsement. It 
is too hopeless because we are entitled to want more from public life than giving in to 
periods of relative peace out of frustration and fatigue. Stability for the right reasons is 
not simply a matter of happenstance resulting from a circumstantial “balance of relative 
forces” (PL 148). Rawls’ overlapping consensus is meant to represent a middle ground 
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between these extremes. It can result in stability without requiring the impossible or 
settling for a compromise, because it allows people from different views to accept the 
political values for their own sake. That is, the political values at the focus of the 
overlapping consensus are compelling enough as moral reasons in and of themselves to 
garner agreement in both breadth and depth. Thus the overlapping consensus allows for 
not just stability, but stability for the right reasons (PL 385).  
However, because the political values themselves must be acceptable to many 
conflicting doctrines for their own sake, the content of the political is limited. The focus 
of the overlapping consensus must “put no obstacles in the path of all reasonable 
doctrines endorsing a political conception by eliminating from this conception any idea 
that goes beyond the political, and which not all reasonable doctrines could reasonably be 
expected to endorse” (PL 389). Thus it must not contain values that belong exclusively to 
comprehensive doctrines. As Rawls states, “By avoiding comprehensive doctrines we try 
to bypass religion and philosophy’s profoundest controversies so as to have some hope of 
uncovering a basis for a stable overlapping consensus” (PL 152). To be clear, this 
avoidance of controversy internal to the political values does not imply that Rawls 
restricts the political agenda in social life.7  And while we may like to see our pet 
comprehensive notion of political justice to hold the focus of others, to do so is to we 
may be expect too much: we would be asking others to endorse their own political 
coercion on terms they disagree with. Additionally, recall that the content of the political 
values are also importantly related to individuals’ identities and their conceptions of 
themselves (See Chapter 1 above). The political values figure in more or less deep ways 
in the lives of all reasonable citizens. So they must not be too narrowly construed.  
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I do not take issue with the idea that the political values must be agreeable to all 
to satisfy a criterion of endorsement. However, for Rawls, once the political values are 
endorsed, the content of the political conception reigns supreme in our consideration of 
other comprehensive doctrines. Indeed, even when it comes to the public justification of 
the political conception itself, the content of the comprehensive doctrines are closed off 
from view. Rawls elaborates on this in response to a question by Habermas, “What 
bearing do doctrines within an overlapping consensus have on the justification of the 
political conception—once citizens see that conception as both reasonable and 
freestanding?” (PL 385).8 Public justification entails public affirmation of the political 
conception by citizens of different comprehensive doctrines. And while citizens from all 
walks of life publically justify the conception by embedding it into their comprehensive 
doctrines, the doctrines themselves have “no normative role in public justification” (PL 
386). Citizens are able to see each other as reasonable co-endorsers only on the terms of 
the political conception itself. This is so because “citizens do not look into the content of 
others’ doctrines and so remain within the bounds of the political” (PL 386). It is 
tempting to view this as a straitjacket preventing citizens from engaging with each other’s 
deeper beliefs and how these relate to the political. To be fair, Rawls is responding here 
to the idea of justification as it was presented in A Theory of Justice, which depended “on 
everyone holding the same comprehensive doctrine” (PL 387 n.21). Taking into 
consideration the fact of pluralism, justification must not assume a single comprehensive 
doctrine. Indeed, it must involve several. Why does the fact of pluralism drive Rawls to 
fill the space once occupied by a comprehensive doctrine (justice as fairness a al A 
Theory of Justice) with the single political conception insulated from the content of 
                                                                                                   
 
83
comprehensive doctrines? This seems to be a mistake: the shared space of the political 
conception might also be a space for interchange between the comprehensive doctrines.  
Rawls seems to be concerned that the content of the doctrines is a source of 
contention. Indeed, Rawls specifically asks, “How is it possible for there to exist over 
time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided 
by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?” (Italics added PL 4). Rawls 
seems to assume that after the overlapping consensus is endorsed, people necessarily 
remain as divided as they were before. This pessimistic view of the overlapping 
consensus requires mending because political activities, such as public justification, must 
allow for adequate interchange between different people in order to help with struggles 
over identity. To be clear, this does not require utopian daydreams about civil peace, 
which Rawls is certainly not entertaining. I suggest simply that perhaps the overlapping 
consensus is an opportunity for people of different backgrounds to learn how to live 
together and this may involve sharing their reasons for endorsing the shared political 
conception to begin with.  
II. The Duty of Civility 
Rawls acknowledges comprehensive doctrines in a second way in his later work, 
“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.” There he stipulates that in the wide view of 
public political culture people can raise concerns and argue from their comprehensive 
doctrines at any time, so long as a proviso is forthcoming (See Chapter 3 above). To be 
clear, the proviso requirement is indispensable because it demands that in debates over 
decisions that are coercive in character (i.e. will have the force of law) citizens and public 
officials must appeal to reasons that all have endorsed. My comments are not meant to 
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question this requirement. Rather, my concern entails the consideration given to the 
expression of comprehensive reasons when they arise in political deliberation. In this 
section I explore the moral duty of civility and the role it plays in public reason. I argue 
that the duty of civility is insufficient, because it falls short of fostering a climate of open 
listening in political deliberations over the most severe conflicts: those having to do with 
basic questions of justice and the constitutional essentials. 
The values of political justice that form the focus of the overlapping consensus 
can be broken down into two categories: the principles of justice themselves and the 
values of public reason.9 Public reason can be understood as “guidelines for applying the 
principles of justice that presumably all reasonable persons accept in a well-ordered 
society.” 10 A feature of public reason is that different comprehensive doctrines will 
utilize and employ the political conception in different ways. A list of public reasons can 
be compiled for any political question; it is simply a matter of applying the political 
conception to a particular problem. (For example, in Chapter 3 I illustrated Rawls’ 
enumeration of public reasons as they pertain to the family. Different specifications could 
surely exist). Of utmost importance, then, is that citizens’ political claims and decisions 
are accompanied by public reasons to which all other citizens agree.  People meet the 
proviso requirement when they appeal to these reasons alongside comprehensive reasons 
to support their arguments. In doing so they also fulfill their moral duty of civility. It is to 
this duty that I now turn. 
The duty of civility is a moral not a legal duty. Rawls defines it as the duty “to be 
able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the principles and 
policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public 
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reason” (PL 217). This duty is directly related to the principle of legitimacy, which 
defines legitimate political power in terms of a criterion of endorsement, referring of 
course to the overlapping consensus. Freeman points out that there is a certain ambiguity 
around the duty of civility regarding the extent to which one needs to justify political 
decisions in the terms of public reason. In some instances, we may not know what the 
root motivation for our political belief is, or we may not fully understand it, or we may 
only have knowledge of it in terms of our comprehensive doctrine. Whatever the case, 
Freeman argues that it is enough to suppose that Rawls simply meant that people must 
believe in earnest that they could appeal to shared political values in presenting their 
political position. Thus, the duty of civility can be understood as meeting the proviso 
requirement.  
So Rawls’ duty of public civility is met simply by giving reasons that can be 
agreed upon by citizens who form a consensus on a political conception of justice. For 
example, political debates over abortion cannot refer to the soul of the fetus or the 
sacredness of human life, because these notions could not be accompanied by the 
proviso: they are not defensible according to political values.11 Similarly, political 
debates over same-sex marriage should neither appeal to the fear of difference nor to the 
purported sinfulness of homosexual relations.12 As Nussbaum states, “Not all reasons for 
opposing same-sex marriage are based on irrational fear. But the reasons that are not 
based on fear do not look like public reasons, part of the shared ethical space we share 
together; they look like theological reasons that are inside the private domain of the 
religions in question.”13 The upshot here is that the duty of civility, along with public 
reason and the proviso, prevents people from attacking, criticizing or trespassing upon 
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each other’s comprehensive doctrines. Indeed, what could enter the debate is restricted by 
public reason, and neither public reason nor the political conception itself is capable of 
attacking, criticizing, or trespassing against any comprehensive doctrines. (PL 441, 490). 
Public dialogue must be so restricted because citizens cannot “even approach mutual 
understanding;” there are irreconcilable differences between their comprehensive 
doctrines (PL 441).  
So the duty of civility plays an important role in preventing citizens from unduly 
criticizing people’s most cherished beliefs or ways of life. Certainly political debates 
about such serious issues should be guided by public reason and not repugnant 
sentiments. However, I would like to suggest that we also could legitimately expect an 
atmosphere of open dialogue in debating such issues. This of course, would require that 
people listen to each other when discussing issues that they may not agree with and some 
may find insulting to the core. Indeed, citizens may have to develop a habit of empathy 
when in contact with those who they may not understand or even despise. But learning 
how to live in a pluralist society requires listening and considering diametrically opposed 
views; neither of these requirements entails endorsement nor requires agreement. And 
since the moral duty of civility is not a strict requirement there is no harm in extending its 
spirit towards empathy.  
Rawls seems to suggest this when he defines the duty of civility. He makes a 
positive recommendation for how citizens should act towards one another when he states 
that the duty of civility also involves a “willingness to listen to others” and requires fair-
mindedness in the face of the need to accommodate others’ views (PL 217). He again 
makes similar suggestion when describing how the principle of legitimacy is based on the 
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criterion of reciprocity, which requires that “our exercise of political power is proper only 
when we sincerely believe that the reasons we would offer for our political actions are 
sufficient and we also reasonably think other citizens might reasonably accept those 
reasons” (italics added PL 447). Together, the criterion of reciprocity and the duty of 
civility requires considering other people’s beliefs as well as listening to them. This 
suggests more than Rawls’ more frequently expressed motivation to prevent trespass and 
criticism. Curiously, Rawls does not ever seem to capture this spirit in the political 
conception. Instead of making the political a place of listening, fair-minded 
accommodation, and sincere belief, he again and again refers to the political as a place of 
inevitable and embroiled disagreement. There will no doubt be disagreement, but this is 
all the more reason to understand our civic duty to each other in terms of learning and 
understanding instead of preventing offense. This inclination serves as a springboard for 
fostering a political sphere that welcomes the consideration of identity, complete with 
sufficient guidance for considering each other’s political claims, even across vast 
differences. 
III. Political Amendments 
It is important to remember that Rawls’ project is to offer answers to the problem 
of political justice. At its core this problem concerns how citizens in a pluralist society 
can live together under the same political conception of justice. My intention here is to 
offer an amendment to Rawls’ position that could improve the overall quality of this life 
together. To do so I consider the two concerns that seem to motivate Rawls’ restricting of 
the political sphere to a place of coexistence among inevitable and deep disagreement. 
The first is the need to dissolve any obstacles that would prevent some comprehensive 
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doctrines from endorsing the political conception; and I take this to be related to Rawls’ 
insulating of the justification process itself. The second is Rawls’ desire to make the 
political a safe and free place where people can engage in political debate without the risk 
of being insulted or criticized. I discuss these in turn. 
The first concern requires an amendment to the overlapping consensus itself so 
that agreeing upon political values can be seen as compatible with knowing about each 
other’s comprehensive doctrines. I suggest two ways in which this could be done. The 
first is simply a matter of interpretation and the second challenges Rawls’ insistence that 
the overlapping consensus is freestanding.  
Claudia Mills suggests that people in a pluralist democracy could come upon an 
overlapping consensus “based on the experience of living together and liking it.”14 She 
argues that Rawls’ insistence on the overlapping consensus places the focus only on the 
endorsement of the “rules” of justice. She stresses instead that the focus be on the 
“quality of our shared life together,” which places emphasis not only on why we endorse 
the political conception, but that we truly endorse it.15  She takes her cue from Rawls’ 
argument for how the overlapping consensus could grow out of a mere modus vivendi. A 
mere modus vivendi could evolve to a constitutional consensus, and then eventually to an 
overlapping consensus (PL 153-158). So the overlapping consensus on her view is not 
simply a matter of endorsing compelling political values. It is a wholehearted embrace on 
behalf of people who have experienced life together and come to agree on shared values 
by way of this experience. For Mills, Rawls’ mistake lies in his insistence that the 
overlapping consensus is composed of comprehensive doctrines. “We do not need a story 
about how our allegiance to our principles of justice is rooted in our comprehensive 
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doctrines, but about how it is rooted in the shared experienced of our life together.”16 
This shift in emphasis does not entail a (communitarian) community of shared 
comprehensive views. It simply requires valuing principles of justice simply because they 
make living together better and more possible. This view certainly answers my concern 
about Rawls’ insistence on closing the political conception after its endorsement. Mill’s 
wholehearted consensus certainly would not require citizens to refrain from referencing 
or knowing about each other’s comprehensive doctrines. The unfortunate issue, however, 
is that the experience of life together could be miserable and insufficient for instigating 
the will to consensus.17 I turn to another option in which there may be normative bases to 
undergird an optimistic view of life in pluralism.    
Larmore suggests that Rawls’ overlapping consensus is not freestanding, and 
identifies Rawls’ latent appeal to moral authority as the moral basis of political 
liberalism. He argues, “our commitment to democracy or political self-determination 
cannot be understood except by appeal to a higher moral authority, which is the 
obligation to respect one another as persons.”18 Larmore notes that commitment to the 
principle of equal respect has become a matter of second nature and that Rawls may have 
not given it the treatment it deserves in his own thought, even as it underlies the main 
aspects of his theory of justice from the notion of fairness to the criterion of reciprocity. 
Indeed, Larmore notes that we often “look through it” and reflect instead on the 
constitutional rules of a democracy or assess the numerous ways people can come to 
tolerate each other regardless of difference. One reason for overlooking this is that self-
determination enjoys an incredible moral prestige in our time. Rawls perhaps relies on it 
when he demands that endorsement should stem from a person’s comprehensive views, 
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and not from some higher value she shares with others. But it may be that endorsement is 
motivated from a value that democratic peoples have come to share: the normative value 
of equal respect.19  
Larmore argues that the value of equal respect is foundational in the overlapping 
consensus, not because it is found to be agreeable to every reasonable comprehensive 
doctrine, but because it is the moral value that motivates citizens to join an overlapping 
consensus in the first place. He states, “In reality equal respect defines the specific moral 
‘we’ we have come to be in the democratic world, even as we remain divided by 
important differences about other fundamental matters.”20 Thus Rawls would not need to 
worry so deeply about clearing the political conception of obstacles to endorsement. 
Reasonable comprehensive doctrines could work out the content of the political 
conception under the guidance of equal respect. So there would be no need for restricting 
the public justification from the normative concerns of comprehensive doctrines. Doing 
so is publically justifiable in appeal to the principle of equal respect, and thus no harm 
would be done if people placed their comprehensive reasons in full view of each other.  
This is because those comprehensive doctrines that could form an overlapping consensus 
share the normative value of equal respect.21 This value could guide them through 
learning to respect each other even across the most intractable differences.  
Both of the amendments allow for the fact that citizens could agree about a wider 
range of values. Motivated by the value of equal respect, they could, perhaps, as 
Nussbaum suggests form a consensus around the value of appropriate compassion.22 For 
Nussbaum a compassionate society would entail both compassionate institutions and 
compassionate individuals. My interest in the idea, however, regards what it could mean 
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for the moral duty of civility as understood in terms of public reason. If part of the reason 
for limiting the introduction of comprehensive reasons into political debates is respect for 
people’s cherished beliefs, then public reasons which appeal to the value of appropriate 
compassion would allow not only for such protections, but also help ensure active 
listening and even empathy in the political sphere. Further, the value of appropriate 
compassion may demand that comprehensive reasons be heard out and considered fully, 
even though the ultimate binding decision would require the proviso. As Nussbaum 
suggests, “we will continue to need compassion as an appropriate response and as a 
motive to attend with concern to the needs of our fellows, a motive that needs recognition 
in the design of the political conception.”23 Indeed, if it were part of a consensus, 
compassion could form part of public reason and help guide political debates over 
constitutional essentials, which also welcome contentious and sensitive comprehensive 
reasons. With appropriate compassion as a value of public reason, when Rawls’ invites 
people and their identities into to serious discussion in public political culture he could 
ensure that they are listened to openly, respected, and treated compassionately, even 
while some in their audience may once have found their views “repugnant.” 
These amendments would allow for the consideration of issues of identity in the 
political insofar as they avoid what I take to be Rawls’ reasons for excluding them. This 
has the double effect of making Rawls’ solution to the question of justice both more 
optimistic, and open to disagreements and conflict. This may seem like a contradiction, 
but working out life in a pluralist society requires both the outlook that it is possible and 
the willingness to confront disagreements and work out just solutions to them. Imagining 
the possibility of wholehearted acceptance of an overlapping consensus founded on the 
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principle of equal respect has a deep effect on how we receive the views of others with 
whom we may disagree in the political forum and it may also afford us the momentum to 
disclose our own potentially unpopular comprehensive views when pertinent. Moreover, 
given these amendments, discussing these views is quite compatible with the political 
conception and could not effect our endorsement of it nor its public justification. In a 
certain sense, acting respectfully and compassionately towards each other as endorsers of 
a shared conception of political justice simply serves to strengthen the political bonds of 
life in pluralist society. Openness to the possibility of the best possible life in pluralism 
could have a profound effect on how we come to political debates. “The answer that we 
give to the question of whether a just democratic society is possible and can be stable for 
the right reasons affects our background thoughts and attitudes about the world as a 
whole. And it affects thoughts and attitudes before we come to actual politics, and limits 
or inspires how we take part in it” (PL lix).   
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Notes
                                                
1 See Michael Sandel’s review of Political Liberalism in Public Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005) and Claudia Mill’s discussion in “’Not a mere modus Vivendi’: The bases for 
allegiance to the just state” in Davion & Wolf  pp. 191-192. 
2 Larmore 211 
3 Larmore 211 
4 Freeman 365 
5 Freeman 366-367 
6 Claudia Mills sets up a helpful interpretation of Rawls’ intention on adjudicating between the extremes of 
monolithic community and modus vivendi. Claudia Mills “’Not a mere modus vivendi’: The Bases for 
Allegiance to a Just State,” The Idea of a Political Liberalism: Essays on Rawls, eds. Victoria Davion and 
Clark Wolf (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000) 190-204. 
7 “Questions are not removed from the political agenda, so to speak, solely because they are a source of 
conflict” (PL 151). 
8 This is Rawls’ summary of Habermas’ concern as to whether the comprehensive doctrines have a role in 
the justification of the overlapping consensus.  
9 Freeman 372 
10 Freeman 372 
11 Freeman 414 
12 For a discussion on the relationship between political values and comprehensive religious doctrines with 
respect to debates on same sex marriage see Martha C. Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience (New York: Basic 
Books, 2008) 334-346. (343). 
13 Nussbaum, Liberty 336 
14 Mills 198 
15 Mills 198 
16 Mills 202 
17 Mills acknowledges this in reference to the historical divisions between races and racism in the United 
States. She states, “If stability is easier to get in some ways than Rawls suggests, it is also harder. When we 
share a common history and culture, we can build on those to establish a political community as well. But 
when common history and culture are lacking, no amount of shared allegiance to political principles may 
be enough to bridge the gap. This may be why race continues tragically to divide a nation that fought a civil 
war to stay united in the principles of justice affirmed at its founding” (203).  
18 Larmore 167 
19 On this point Larmore is clear that to have grasped the reasons for equal respect’s validity may require 
having had “a certain history and gone through certain experiences” (165). Indeed he denies that human 
beings acquire this fundamental moral through “foundationalist” means. It is not a priori or rationally 
indubitable; it is historically contingent. This is where I find a connection to Mill’s argument. However, 
Larmore’s is more robust in the sense that the historical experience “living together” brings with it an 
autonomous moral principle shared across several conceptions of the good.  
20 Larmore 166 
21 It is important to note that Larmore would not interpret his suggestion this way. He strongly warns 
against inviting comprehensive concerns into the political, holding instead that some issues are to be 
worked out in civil society. The assumption is that discussion in civil society would be fully unrestricted. 
That is all well and good, but I believe there comes a point where people do need to work some things out 
politically. And inviting such political discussions could help foster a political attitude of open mindedness 
toward the unfamiliar and empathy or compassion toward the “repugnant.”  
22 Compassion is to be appropriate, because “a compassionate society might still be an unjust society. It 
might weep about the fact that taxes cause people to miss out on luxury goods such as peacock’s tongues. 
And it might fail to weep about the Joads, forced into destitution by the absence of asocial safety net. It 
might blame the poor for their plight and fail to blame those who exploit them.” Martha Nussbaum, 
Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 414. 
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23 Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals 405. The reference here to the Joads refers to John Steinbeck’s The 
Grapes of Wrath. 
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CHAPTER 5: PRIMARY GOODS AND CONSIDERATIONS OF IDENTITY 
  
I now consider whether Rawls’ index of primary goods is adequate for ensuring 
that citizens’ basic needs can be met in such a way as to acknowledge variations in social 
identity. I have offered a cursory treatment of this question both in considering the role of 
the primary goods in fostering ethical success (Chapter 1 above) and also in discussing 
the variation of needs that emerge among different cultural ways of life (Chapter 2 
above). It seems doubtful that Rawls’ index is adequate. Rawls offers primary goods as 
the “all-purpose means” for citizens to pursue their conception of the good, whatever else 
their interests. For Rawls, regardless of the specificity of their identity, each citizen’s 
needs as free and equal persons can be considered according to the same index of primary 
goods. For Rawls, justice requires making these goods available not by considering 
individuals in terms of their identity, social circumstance, geography, physical ability, 
etc., but by creating social institutions that are able to supply all-purpose resources. Yet it 
is dubious whether such goods could do justice to social inequalities: the needs of a 
diversity of citizens could not possibly fit into a one-size-fits-all institutional agenda. 
Indeed, primary goods alone seem to be incapable of picking out and alleviating 
inequalities pertaining both to people’s identities and to their physical abilities.  
 In light of the inadequacies of Rawls’ primary goods I will discuss a rival view, 
the capabilities approach, as it is understood by Amartya Sen. My intention in doing so is 
not to argue that one approach is better than the other, but rather to explore each view’s 
strengths and weaknesses. Indeed, I argue that primary goods and capabilities are 
complementary notions and that extending the range of primary goods by invoking the 
capabilities approach allows for accommodating the variation in degree and kind of needs 
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in diverse societies. In making this argument I will show that Rawls offers one type of 
primary good that stands without the need of extension; basic rights and liberties are by 
nature one-size-fits-all. However, the other primary goods, opportunities, powers, and the 
social bases of self-respect are context dependent and require the addition of the 
capabilities approach for appropriate accommodations. After a detailed discussion of the 
primary goods, I briefly describe Sen’s criticism and alternative to the primary goods. 
Finally, I argue that primary goods and capabilities are complementary and that justice 
requires extending some primary goods to consider capabilities.  
I. The Primary Goods 
 In offering a list of primary goods, Rawls is intent on describing what kinds of 
claims are appropriate for citizens to make, and what is required by justice to support 
those claims. Rawls seeks a shared understanding of what such claims could amount to, 
and so he must answer the following question: “Given the different and opposing, and 
even incommensurable conceptions of the good in a well-ordered society, how is such a 
public understanding possible?” (CP 361).  Rawls’ answer to this question changed over 
the course of his life. He first answers the question by an appeal to the original position, 
and then in terms of the political conception of the person.  
The first answer I consider to the question at hand appears in the 1982 article, 
“Social Unity and Primary Goods.” There Rawls describes the primary goods from the 
perspective of the original position, which views the person as free and equal in terms of 
the two moral powers—the capacity for a sense of justice and a the capacity to pursue 
and revise a conception of the good. Parties in the original position rationally discover the 
primary goods, which are “necessary conditions for realizing the powers of moral 
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personality and are all-purpose means for sufficiently wide range of final ends’’ (CP 
267). This presupposes a partial similarity between all persons’ wants, abilities, character, 
requirements of nurture, and relations of social dependence, etc. (CP 267). The similarity 
is represented by the parities in the original position as free and equal. The primary goods 
are as follows: 
 
(i) The basic liberties (freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, etc.) are the 
background institutions necessary for the development and exercise of the 
capacity to decide upon and revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the 
good. Similarly, these liberties allows for the development and exercise of the 
sense of right and justice under political and social conditions that are free.1  
(ii) Freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background of 
diverse opportunities and required for the pursuit of final ends as well as to give 
effect to a decision to revise and change them, if one so desires. 
(iii) Powers and prerogatives of offices of responsibility are needed to give scope 
to various self-governing and social capacities of the self.  
(iv) Income and wealth, understood broadly as they must be, are all-purpose 
means (having an exchange value) for achieving directly or indirectly a wide 
range of ends, whatever they happen to be. 
(v) The social bases of self-respect are those aspects of basic institutions that are 
normally essential if citizens are to have a lively sense of their own worth as 
moral persons and to be able to realize their highest-order interests and advance 
their ends with self-confidence. (CP 366) 
 
These primary goods are offered as the solution to a public understanding of what can be 
appropriately claimed in questions of justice among citizens with conflicting and 
“incommensurable” conceptions of the good. When these all-purpose means are met, all 
citizens are able to develop and exercise their highest order interest, their notion of the 
good.  
 In Political Liberalism, Rawls came to see citizens as having “irreconcilable” 
conceptions of the good, which he understood as commensurable in as much as they can 
engage in a mutual agreement on the political conception. However, with few exceptions, 
his list and understanding of primary goods remained much the same.2 It is important to 
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note that Political Liberalism presents primary goods independently of the original 
position. Rawls notes there that several background conditions help to specify citizens’ 
needs. These include the political conception of the person, a person’s rational life plan 
(also known as “goodness as rationality”), the basic facts of social life, and the conditions 
of human growth and nurture. This background, however, does not presuppose any 
comprehensive doctrines and is still fairly abstracted from people’s actual identities. The 
primary goods enumerate needs that can be recognized as advantageous to all, regardless 
of the content of their life plans. That is, the primary goods are based on the objective 
circumstances of every citizen. The primary goods themselves show how a public 
understanding is possible to determine what can be considered advantageous in political 
justice (PL 187). This means that we can “present a scheme of equal basic liberties and 
fair opportunities, which when guaranteed by the basic structure, ensures for all citizens 
the adequate development, and full exercise of the two moral powers and a fair share of 
the all-purpose means” (PL 187). Thus the index of primary goods can be practicably 
incorporated into social institutions. 
 There are two questions I would like to pursue regarding this understanding of the 
primary goods. The first, addressed in the next section, concerns how it is possible for a 
single scheme of primary goods to cover the incredible range of diverse circumstances 
that citizens find themselves in. I argue that more needs to be said about the relationship 
between actual persons and the good. The second, addressed in the final section, regards 
whether or not it makes sense to apply each of the primary goods the same way to all 
citizens. The basic liberties apply to all as a matter of understanding persons as free and 
equal. However, opportunities, powers, and self-respect seem to be contextual matters. I 
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shall argue in the end that primary goods and capabilities are complementary; primary 
goods are practicable for social institutions, while capabilities allow for the consideration 
of specificity in terms of physicality, social position, and identity. 
 
II. The Capabilities Approach 
 Sen’s critique of Rawls’ primary goods does not simply pertain to the variation 
that exists between people in pluralist societies with respect to their comprehensive 
doctrines. Rather it regards the variations that may exit in one’s ability to convert primary 
goods into actual freedom. Such variations may involve a person’s physical ability, sex, 
age, genetic endowments, etc.3 Sen holds that “equality of holdings of primary goods or 
of resources can go hand in hand with serious inequalities in actual freedoms enjoyed by 
different persons.”4 He argues that these inequalities are not compatible with the political 
conception of justice.  
 Instead, Sen offers a capabilities-based assessment of inequalities. Sen defines 
capabilities in terms of the achievement of functioning. “The functionings can vary from 
the most elementary ones, such as being well-nourished, avoiding escapable morbidity 
and premature mortality, etc., to quite complex and sophisticated achievements, such as 
having self-respect, being able to take part in life of the community, and so on.”5 So 
talking in terms of capabilities means that a person’s actual situation must be accounted 
for and that the assurance of available resources is insufficient for accounting for actual 
functionings. The capability-based assessment of justice considers individual claims in 
terms of “the freedoms that they actually enjoy to choose their lives that they have reason 
to value.”6 The advantage of the capability-based approach is that it is able to pick out 
inequalities that primary goods fail to acknowledge. For instance, a person who has a 
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disability may have more primary goods but less capability to utilize them because of a 
handicap. Or a person may have more income and available nutrition but have less 
capability to become well nourished because of illness, or even because of pregnancy. 
The upshot is that regardless of a person’s comprehensive doctrine, they may simply get 
less from an optimal distribution of primary goods.  
On the other hand, capabilities are based upon people’s actual freedom and take 
into account the particularities of their life. This may involve ways in which people 
choose to identify, for example as mothers, as people with disabilities, or as Deaf. Or it 
may apply to racial, ethnic, or cultural identifications within societies that privilege a 
majority culture or in cases in which language or geographical boundaries exist between 
people and their basic needs.7 Sen’s capability-based approach can recognize disparities 
in people’s ability to transfer available goods to actual freedoms. This approach has an 
advantage over primary goods, because the latter are understood as means or resources 
only. Such means are simply too fixed to ensure justice. Sen’s focus on actual freedom 
involves seeking both equality of means and equality of results.8  
III. Shaping Institutions and Meeting Diverse Needs 
 In offering his capabilities approach, Sen also defends the special nature of liberty 
and argues that it deserves special treatment over and above its status as a primary good. 
That is, the principle of liberty has a special priority over other principles of justice. He 
acknowledges the difference between reducing a person’s capabilities by way of a 
violation of his liberty and a reduction caused by suffering from an internal or natural 
debilitation.9 Sen discloses that the capability approach is not “entirely adequate” for a 
theory of justice, because these two cases are not distinguishable on the capabilities 
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approach. Indeed he states: “The importance of over-all freedom to achieve cannot 
eliminate the special significance of negative freedom.”10 Sen discusses this largely in 
response to HLA Hart’s criticism of the priority of liberty in order to simply emphasize 
the demands of liberty over and above Rawls’ understanding of it as a resource or 
primary good.  
Given the special status of liberty, I hold that liberty as a primary good does entail 
the social unity Rawls attempted to discover in enumerating the primary goods. Liberty 
has the dual status of a principle and an effective “resource” or good for all persons 
understood as free and equal, regardless of their identity. At the same time, while there 
seems to be a social unity in terms of people’s claims of liberty, the other primary goods 
need not be limited to the narrow specification people share in common with others. I 
argue for extending Rawls’ understanding of the other primary goods so as to include a 
capabilities-based assessment. Opportunity, powers, wealth (in abroad sense), and self-
respect require both institutional practicability and the consideration of the particular 
relationship between a person and the good. My argument for the extension of the last 
four primary goods will proceed in two steps. First, I discuss the complementary nature 
of primary goods and capabilities. Second, I gesture toward how Rawls’ notion of 
primary goods needs to be extended to accommodate capabilities considerations. My 
argument for liberty as a primary good emerges within this discussion.   
 If primary goods are complementary with capabilities, then it must be shown that 
they offer something for which capabilities cannot account and which a just society 
cannot do without. Indeed, the primary goods have a particular advantage over the 
capabilities approach. Namely, the index of primary goods is designed to be practicable 
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for institutions and thus they are “well suited for providing a public criterion of justice.” 
Henry Brighouse and Elaine Unterhalter argue that focusing on the subjective states of 
individuals is ill suited for this task because they are not easily publically monitored.11 
They hold that the capabilities approach has this difficulty because it is very hard to 
publically compare people’s enjoyment of similar capabilities sets. This is compounded 
by the difficulty of providing an index of capabilities. While Sen relies more on the 
notion of actual functioning, Nussbaum enumerates a list of general prerequisites (not 
actual functionings) for the state to make available to individuals.12 But her thorough and 
impressive list arguably fails to meet Rawls’ criterion of simplicity and may be difficult 
to actualize. Rawls’ index, on the other hand, is actionable in such a way as to also be 
transparent.  
 But this benefit only goes so far. As Brighouse and Unterhalter point out, 
“Publicity is an advantage, and it is one that the primary goods approach usually enjoys. 
But it enjoys it less, the more plausible it gets.”13 This because in order to become 
plausible in the face of the kind of variations Sen considers, it must appeal to how 
primary goods actually affect people’s lives. And involvement in such private matters is 
surely not capable of full transparency. If doing justice requires diminished transparency, 
so be it. What is important to note, is the complementary nature of primary goods and 
capabilities. “Each approach has advantages over the other when considering particular 
contexts.”14  
 Indeed, in response to Sen, Rawls utilizes the notion of capabilities as an 
alternative explanation of the two moral powers (JF 169). In doing so he exposes the 
distinct advantage of maintaining liberty as a primary good that applies to the political 
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conception of the person with its restricted set of capabilities. He states: “The equal 
political liberties, and freedom of speech and freedom of assembly and the like, are 
necessary for the development and exercise of citizens’ sense of justice and are required 
if citizens are to make rational judgments in the adoption of just political aims and in the 
pursuit of effective social policies” (JF 169). Further he notes that the equal civil 
liberties, liberty of conscious and freedom of association have an important role in 
citizens’ capacity to revise and pursue a conception of the good. Liberty as a primary 
good when limited to these two “capabilities” appears to be quite available to people 
regardless of variation.   
However, the other goods, opportunities, powers, wealth, and self-respect are 
contingent on the specific conditions of a person’s life. They do not involve our general 
ability to develop as citizens or pursue one good rather than another, but pertain to our 
sense of who we are, our identity, and our carrying out of the particular life we have the 
liberty to choose. Additionally, as Sen often discusses, the last four primary goods may 
have nothing to do with our full conception of our selves as such, but concern our 
physical ability or health. But of course, the notion of functionings covers this range.  
 I now turn to a consideration of how to extend Rawls’ primary goods in order to 
specify how they complement capabilities. A more thorough discussion is needed to 
discuss all four individually. For my purposes, a discussion of extending opportunities 
should suffice as a model for similar extensions in the others. Norman Daniels argues that 
the primary social goods could be extended to meet all relevant citizens’ needs by 
illustrating how opportunity could be connected with the idea of normal functioning.15 He 
argues that impairments in normal functioning reduce people’s ability to pursue their 
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plans of life. If opportunity is understood in terms of “the arrays of life plans that it is 
reasonable for [a person] to choose, given their talents and skills, assuming normal 
functioning,” then poor health and disability (which decrease normal functioning) 
radically reduce a person’s fair share of opportunities.16 Thus, Daniels argues that 
protection of fair equal opportunity also requires comprehensive health care, which 
covers not only inequalities in health status, but improvements in people’s health: 
“normal functioning is important to the capabilities of citizens in a democracy.”17 The 
extension includes an element of positive freedom (capability) into Rawls’ understanding 
of primary goods, which for Daniels means that meeting people’s needs through 
(extended) primary goods converges on capabilities. To balance this extension and make 
it more plausible, simply consider Sen’s demand that inequalities between capabilities be 
assessed in order to ensure individual liberty. The two notions of the good converge, even 
if from different directions. 
 There may be plenty of room to argue that the index of primary goods should be 
altered in order to accommodate changes or developments in the social world or to more 
appropriately represent the needs and claims of citizens. Any such index, so long as it is 
also extendable to consider the capabilities individuals have for utilizing social goods, 
could also succeed in creating institutions capable of meeting people’s needs and 
appropriately adjudicating between competing claims. In conclusion, the complementary 
relationship between the index and capabilities-based assessment allows for extending 
primary goods in order to consider variations in the needs of individuals whether 
resulting from identity, physical ability, or social circumstance. This enables primary 
goods to acknowledge numerous variations between people within a diverse society when 
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it comes to their capabilities in utilizing opportunities, powers, wealth, and self-respect. 
Basic liberties, however, can be understood to apply to each person equally and enjoins a 
special status both as a primary good and as a principle of justice.  
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Notes
                                                
1 The full enumerations of the basic liberties is given by this list: “freedom of thought and liberty of 
conscious; freedom of association; and the freedom defined by the liberty and integrity of the person; as 
well as by the rule of law; and finally the political liberties” (CP 362). 
2 See his discussion on leisure as an adjustment to his list of primary goods in JF §53. 
3 Amartya Sen, Inequalities Reexamined (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992) 85. 
4 Sen 81. 
5 Sen, 5 
6 Sen 81 
7 I mention geography here thinking about variations in rural and remote healthcare access.  
8 Sen 87 
9 Sen 87 
10 Sen 87 
11 Harry Brighouse and Elaine Unterhalter, “Primary Goods versus Capabilities: Defending the Good 
against the Equally Good,” ed. Shaun P. Young, Reflections on Rawls: An Assessment of his Legacy 
(Surrey: Ashgate publishing Limited, 2009) 45-60. 
12 See Nussbaum, Frontiers and Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000) 
13 Brighouse and Unterhalter 58 
14 Brighouse and Unterhalter 58 
15 Norman Daniels, “Democratic Equality: Rawls’ Complex Egalitarianism,” The Cambridge Companion 
to Rawls, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 241-276. 
16 Daniels 257 
17Daniels 257 
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